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ABSTRACT 
For over 160 years, The Economist newspaper has been one of the most influential, 
sophisticated, and effective proponents of capitalism.  It has consistently championed and 
conveyed a form of ‘humanitarian political economy’ to its weekly, global audience of 
professionals and business and government leaders.  The Economist began in 1843 to 
campaign for free trade in agriculture and to advocate for the emerging regime of capitalism 
in Britain.  Its primary concern during its first two decades centered on agricultural change.  
This thesis examines those first two decades, from 1843-1863, and The Economist’s focus on 
‘improvement’, or capitalist development, in the English countryside. 
The Economist was a staunch advocate for increased urbanization, private property, 
and ‘high agriculture’ – a modern system of agriculture that involved scientific techniques, 
free trade, large landholdings, and significant amounts of capital.  It vehemently opposed any 
attempts to alleviate rural poverty using measures it felt were inconsistent with the principles 
of political economy and argued rural labourers would be better off if they were forced to sell 
their labour and submit to the discipline of the market.  The Economist repeatedly portrayed 
this process of capitalist development as beneficial for all and as a natural occurrence, brought 
about through the free working of the market.  Its account contributed to the prominent idea 
of the ‘success’ of British agriculture in the 19th century; an idea that has had profound effects 
on subsequent notions of development.   
This thesis uses Marxist and Foucauldian concepts to demonstrate that the process of 
capitalist development in the countryside was not brought about through market forces.  
Extensive and often oppressive government intervention was needed to dispossess people 
from the land and to force them into waged labour.  Though much of this dispossession had 
occurred by the 19th century, The Economist performed a crucial role in advocating for 
policies that cemented capitalist relations of production.  The Economist’s most important 
iii 
function was to spread belief in capitalism by making its inequality and poverty more 
palatable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“I used to think; now I just read The Economist.” – Larry Ellison, CEO, Oracle Corporation 
 
“How did The Economist put it?” – Ronald Reagan, former U. S. president 
 
“May be the most sensible publication in the English language.” – The New York Times1 
 
 
From its inception in London in 1843, The Economist has been read by an influential, 
global audience of senior business, political, and financial decision-makers.  For over 160 
years it has been one of the most consistent, powerful advocates for economic liberalism.  
Today, over a million copies of The Economist are sold through subscriptions and newsstands 
each week in over 200 countries.2  Despite its far-reaching influence, hardly any academic 
work has attempted to explore the newspaper’s impact.3  The two most important studies of 
The Economist were a flattering centenary edition published in 1943 and an equally laudatory 
1993 book on The Economist’s institutional history, paid for by the paper.  In addition to these 
Economist-specific studies, a 1955 article by economist Scott Gordon in The Journal of 
Political Economy emphasized the valuable contribution The Economist’s first editors made 
to classical economics.  Similarly, a 1960 dissertation explored the life and work of the 
paper’s founder and first editor, James Wilson.  As well, a 2001 book by Charlotte Hooper 
                                               
1
 Endorsements, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/. 
2
 The Economist, http://ads.economist.com/.  In 2008 The Economist’s worldwide circulation was 1.3 million.  
http://www.economistgroup.com/pdfs/2008_Annual_report.pdf, p. 5.  Moreover, The Economist now includes 
The Economist Group – a brand family that has evolved into a global media company which “develops 
intelligent brands for a high-end audience.”  http://www.economistgroup.com/what_we_do/our_history.html.  
Since 1928, half of The Economist’s shares have been owned by the Financial Times, a subsidiary of Pearson, 
the other half by a group of independent shareholders. 
http://www.economistgroup.com/what_we_do/editorial_philosophy.html.  In 2008 its operating profit was 44 
million pound sterling.  http://www.economistgroup.com/pdfs/2008_Annual_report.pdf, p. 3.  Advertisers covet 
positions in The Economist because of its editorial environment and global reach.  Phil Sievers, senior vice 
president/management supervisor at Doremus & Company, which placed Bankers Trust advertising with The 
Economist, argued that “from an editorial standpoint, it may well be the best-written and best-edited English-
language magazine in the world.”  Lorne Manly, “Capital Gains.  (The North American edition of The 
Economist),” Folio: the Magazine for Magazine Management 22 (8) (1993): 71. 
3
 Although The Economist is now published weekly in a magazine format, it describes itself as a political, 
literary and general newspaper because it covers news, the main business and political events of the week, as 
well as analysis and opinion.  Because of its editorial anonymity, references will refer to “The Economist”, “the 
paper”, or “it” rather than a human author.  The Economist, 
http://www.economist.com/help/DisplayHelp.cfm?folder=663377#About_The_Economist and  
http://www.economistgroup.com/what_we_do/editorial_philosophy.html. 
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included a case study of The Economist from 1989-1996, which examined how the paper 
constructed international relations as a masculine space.4   
It was an interest in international development that led me to research on The 
Economist.  Development, a widely used, commonly believed in, but scarcely understood 
term, often signifies one of humankind’s most ambitious enterprises to eradicate worldwide 
poverty.  While often thought of as a post-Second World War product, it was a set of 18th 
century European Enlightenment ideas that eventually coalesced into what is now called 
development: these ideas included a growing belief in science and its use to reshape the 
natural world as well as notions of progress, known in its earliest incarnations as 
‘improvement.’  The Enlightenment has been recognized as a movement decisive in the 
making of modernity, in constructing what its philosophers believed was a superior social 
order.5   
The key to linking order and progress, according to Enlightenment theorists, was to 
clear away constraining and confusing traditions and customs.  As John Locke, the presiding 
spirit of the Enlightenment articulated, there was need for “clearing Ground a little, and 
removing some of the Rubbish, that [lay] in the way to Knowledge.”6  The way forward was 
through the application of reason to knowledge and laying sound foundations in scientific 
facts and figures.  Deference to tradition was spurned as antiquated or backward by advocates 
of improvement, and agricultural, commercial, and industrial progress was held up as a source 
not just of profit but of civilization.7   
                                               
4
 A.H. Chapman, et al, The Economist, 1843-1943: A Centenary Volume (London: Oxford University Press, 
1943), Ruth Dudley Edwards, The Pursuit of Reason: The Economist 1843-1993 (London: Hamish Hamilton 
Ltd., 1993), Scott Gordon, “The London Economist and the High Tide of Laissez Faire,” The Journal of 
Political Economy 63 (6) (1955), James Ashby Moncure, “James Wilson and the Economist, 1805-1860” (PhD 
diss., Columbia University, 1960), Charlotte Hooper, Manly States: Masculinities, International Relations, and 
Gender Politics (New York: Colombia University Press, 2001). 
5
 Roy Porter, The Creation of the Modern World: The Untold Story of the British Enlightenment (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), p. 3.   
6
 Cited in Porter, p. 60. 
7
 Porter, pp. 13, 40. 
3 
In the English countryside, no one seemed to exemplify an attachment to tradition 
more than those who relied on common land for subsistence.  As a result, enclosures of the 
English commons and the denial of customary rights became synonymous with improvement.  
This merged with what became a common understanding of history by the early 19th century: 
that human development progressed through a series of ‘stages’, beginning with barbarism in 
an age without private property and ending with civilization in an age of commerce.8  
Enclosures thus became linked with civilization and the inviolability of private property was 
endorsed by Enlightenment writers such as John Locke and Adam Smith.9  As the percentage 
of the population dislocated by enclosures increased, the perceived need to order society 
heightened.  To control the threat of this new propertyless class and to turn them into wage 
labourers, the ‘discipline of the market’ was to be enforced.  The evolving social order was 
represented by emerging regimes of capital and it was through the self-regulating, organizing 
miracles of the market that order, liberty, and prosperity were to be worked out.  By the 
beginning of the 19th century, the writings of the Reverend Thomas Malthus helped justify 
restricting assistance to the poor and the application of the discipline of the market to workers 
and peasants.  Current ideas of development are a continuation of these earlier concepts of the 
proper means for ordering society.  In a sense, development became the universalization of 
improvement.  
The Economist was a powerful apostle of this ideology of improvement.  It articulated 
and promoted a particular conception of progress, unleashed during the Enlightenment, which 
included a move toward industrial agriculture, a manufacturing population, and a respectable 
middle class.  The paper was established, it maintained, to take part in “a severe contest 
between intelligence, which pressed forward, and an unworthy, timid ignorance obstructing 
                                               
8
 Murray G. H. Pittock, “Historiography,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. 
Alexander Broadie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 262 and C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the 
Modern World, 1780-1914: global connections and comparisons (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 299-
300. 
9
 Porter, p. 16. 
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our progress.”10  It was the agricultural interest, which was most strongly protected by law 
that The Economist viewed as particularly obstructing progress.  It argued that agriculture in 
Britain was afflicted with inefficient agrarian traditions; the land was encumbered with 
protections and restrictions.  It claimed that agriculture was in need of liberation from these 
age-old, ‘unnatural’ constraints.  Farmers and rural labourers, according to the paper, 
constituted a distinct caste, shut up in its own narrow sphere, profoundly ignorant of how the 
affairs of the world were carried on.11  They were in a “behind-the-spirit-of-the-age state”; 
those who were still employed in the cultivation of the soil were “avowedly the most 
wretched and ignorant portion of [the] population.”12  Throughout its articles, The Economist 
urged the elimination of any non-modern vestiges of traditional society and advocated the 
dispossession of those still clinging to small plots of land.  It held out hope that the spread of 
reason would overcome what it felt were the limits of habit and ignorance.  Each week the 
paper devoted a section to the topic of agriculture and employed the language and authority of 
political economy to advocate for its ‘improvement.’ 
This thesis examines The Economist’s first two decades, from 1843 to 1863.  Drawing 
on research from the newspaper’s weekly section on agriculture, as well as any other articles 
within the paper pertaining to agriculture – in over 1,000 issues – this thesis contends that The 
Economist was obsessed with improvement, particularly when it came to the land and its 
labourers.  This might seem to be a somewhat mundane contention, until we explore the 
contemporary meaning of the term ‘improvement.’  According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, the word ‘improve’, from the 17th until the late 19th century, was often applied to 
the land and literally meant to do something for monetary profit, to increase something in 
                                               
10
 James Wilson, Prospectus http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1873490.  This phrase has 
been enshrined on the contents page of The Economist since 1991. 
11
 “Helplessness and Hopelessness of the Anti-League Movement,” The Economist, January 20, 1844, p. 402. 
12
 “Proposed College of Chemistry,” The Economist, August 3, 1844, p. 1061; “The Cultivation of Waste and 
Other Lands.  Native Industry.”  The Economist, December 28, 1844, pp. 1562-1564. 
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value.13  In the 17th century, the word ‘improver’ was firmly fixed in the English language to 
refer to someone who rendered land productive and profitable through agricultural 
innovations and by enclosure and cultivation of waste land.  By the 18th century, agricultural 
improvement was a well-established practice, and by the 19th century scientific farming and 
productivity and profit were inextricably tied to the concept of improvement.  Improvement 
became, in other words, a code word for capitalist farming.14  For The Economist, 
improvement meant clearing away any old customs and practices that constrained profit or 
interfered with the most productive use of land.  Thus ‘improvement’ – despite the modern 
connotations given the word – was not a benign process without casualties; The Economist’s 
campaign for improvement constituted an attack on all those obviously afflicted with old 
customs and practices, the majority of the rural ‘poor’.   
Though from the late middle ages the system of property relations in the English 
countryside had been undergoing a profound change, the transformations in the social 
relations of production that were to become essential to a fully developed capitalism had not 
yet been completed by the mid-19th century.  Crucial changes such as the enclosure of 
common land, the concentration of landholdings, the separation of people from control of the 
means of production, the commodification of labour, and the emergence of the rural triad of 
landowner, capitalist tenant farmer, and wage labourer had been set in motion.  Within this 
triad of rural classes a small number of landlords owned large amounts of land and on rare 
occasions also farmed it.  They rented out their land to tenant farmers and exercised influence 
over them.  Some tenant farmers became wealthy capitalists, farming substantial amounts of 
land.  They were motivated by profit, produced mainly for the market, and employed rural 
                                               
13
 Oxford English Dictionary online, 2nd edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
http://dictionary.oed.com.cyber.usask.ca/cgi/entry/50113527?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=improve
ment&first=1&max_to_show=10, 
http://dictionary.oed.com.cyber.usask.ca/cgi/entry/50113530?query_type=word&queryword=improvement&first
=1&max_to_show=10&single=1&sort_type=alpha.  Also see Neal Wood, John Locke and Agrarian Capitalism 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 58. 
14
 Ellen Meiksins Wood, The Origin of Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1999), pp. 80-83 and 
Porter, p. 306. 
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labourers.  However, at the time The Economist began publishing there were still numerous 
small-scale farmers who had rights to common land, had little capital, produced both for 
subsistence and for the market, employed family labour, and made non-market decisions 
regarding production.15  Throughout the 19th and into the 20th century, many of these 
smallholders were dispossessed of land and converted into agricultural labourers.  Landless 
labourers, deprived of their means of subsistence, were forced into poverty, becoming 
dependent on low wages as agricultural or factory workers.  In this thesis I use small-scale 
farmers and agricultural labourers – those who were relatively independent of wages and 
markets and those who were dispossessed of land – to mean the rural ‘poor’.  Their separation 
from their means of subsistence and acceptance of wage labour was neither complete nor as 
rapid as desired.  Marxist theorist Rosa Luxemburg argued their self-provisioning 
“confront[ed] the requirements of capitalism at every turn with rigid barriers” that seemed 
unlikely to collapse on their own accord.16  Indeed, more than the market forces of supply and 
demand were required to integrate the rural poor into the national economy; nonmarket forces 
were needed to clear away the ‘ignorance obstructing Britain’s progress’ and to speed up the 
process of capitalist assimilation in the countryside.17   
Purpose and Argument 
The Economist argued Britain’s progress required vast changes in the countryside, 
including changes in the mode of agricultural production and a rational re-ordering of rural 
society.  It maintained that market forces would naturally bring about a migration from the 
countryside to the city, a capitalist mode of agricultural production, and a population 
disciplined to the market.  It confidently claimed that the agricultural population and all of 
Britain would benefit by these changes.  The Economist’s account of these transformations 
                                               
15
 Michael Turner, Enclosures in Britain 1750-1830 (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), p. 72. 
16
 Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), p. 369.  Michael 
Perelman in The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive 
Accumulation (London: Duke University Press, 2000), p. 93, refers to her work. 
17
 Perelman, pp. 3, 100. 
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contributed to the prominent idea that the ‘success’ of Britain’s agriculture in the 19th century 
and the country’s growing freedom and prosperity was the result of the victory of man over 
nature, of scientific agriculture over traditional farming, and of a modern society dominated 
by the market over other inefficient, backward forms.  This concept of progress has had 
profound effects on subsequent notions of development.   
Yet, The Economist, like the classical political economists, while claiming to be an 
uncompromising adherent to the values of laissez faire, faced a profound dilemma identified 
most famously by Karl Marx: while arguing that markets were the most efficient method for 
organizing production and claiming that wage labour came about in a natural manner, 
capitalism required extensive government intervention to uproot and dispossess people from 
the land, to enlarge farms, and to discipline labour.  Marx labeled this brutal process of 
separating people from the means of providing for themselves and the accumulation of capital 
and wealth by a small sector of society as “primitive accumulation.”  He argued that contrary 
to the claims of the classical political economists, the methods of primitive accumulation were 
“anything but idyllic.”18  Indeed, the process of forcible expropriation began in the 16th 
century as agricultural land in England was enclosed into private property.  Throughout the 
16th and 17th centuries brutal laws were passed against those who had been dispossessed of 
land, driven from their homes, and turned into beggars, robbers, vagabonds, criminals, urban 
poor, and ‘masterless men’.  There were so many of them, they alarmed contemporaries and 
were seen as “potential dissolvents of the society.”19  Beginning under Henry VIII in 1530 
                                               
18
 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. 1.  Translated by Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1977), pp. 873-895. 
19
 Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution (London: 
Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 39-40. 
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until the end of the 18th century, many were executed or whipped, imprisoned, and tortured 
into accepting the discipline necessary for a system of wage labour.20   
Michel Foucault maintained that while the “gloomy festival of punishment” had 
declined by the end of the 18th century, it survived “as a new legal or administrative practice”, 
or according to Peter Linebaugh, as “technological repressions” such as increased 
surveillance, policing, and the factory and wage system.21  Thus, although some of the most 
draconian methods of primitive accumulation had occurred by the 19th century, the state 
continued to employ methods of primitive accumulation.  This thesis argues The Economist 
played an essential role in advocating for policies that furthered the process of primitive 
accumulation, cementing capitalist relations of production.  It performed a vital role in 
justifying these policies, despite the obvious misery they were creating.  Indeed, The 
Economist’s most important task was to spread faith in capitalism and to make its inequality 
and poverty more palatable.  
This thesis explores The Economist’s narrative of improvement; that is, its narrative of 
capitalist development.  It attempts to explain the success of this narrative while shedding 
light on its contradictions and inconsistencies.  It examines the government interventions 
required to bring about these improvements and contends they were intended to clear away 
barriers to the advance of capital.  Given their social relations of production and independence 
from the market, the rural poor were a key barrier to capitalism and the injurious and 
impoverishing effects of these interventions were experienced primarily by them.  
For The Economist, and many improvers in the 19th century, improvement often began 
with nature.  Related to an Enlightenment obsession with mastering nature, The Economist 
maintained that as society advanced it naturally progressed from an agrarian society that 
                                               
20
 See Marx, pp. 896-904, Hill, especially pp. 20, 39-56, Peter Linebaugh, The London Hanged: Crime and Civil 
Society in the Eighteenth Century (London: Verso, 2003), especially pp. 91, 111 and Michel Foucault, Discipline 
and Punish: The birth of the prison (New York: Vintage, 1979), especially pp. 3-103. 
21
 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 8, Linebaugh, p. 162. 
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obtained an easy subsistence and contented itself with few wants and much idleness to an 
urban, industrial society that controlled nature, overcame its limits, and prospered.  The paper 
used environmental determinism – the theory that the natural environment strongly influenced 
people’s habits and human history – to justify a transfer of labour and wealth from the 
countryside to the city.  It also advocated a transformation of the countryside through 
enclosures, deforestation, scientific experiment, and an improved private property regime.  
The Economist portrayed these changes as reasonable and good for the whole country: they 
alleviated the problem of ‘surplus’ labour in the countryside, improved agriculture, met the 
needs of a growing population, and generated economic growth.   
But removing most of Britain’s food producers from the land at a time when it could 
no longer feed itself, encouraging further environmental degradation, and relying on imports 
from other parts of the world, was neither reasonable, beneficial for everyone, nor a natural 
occurrence.  In order to recognize how the extensive changes The Economist advocated were 
carried out, I use James C. Scott’s concept of “high-modernism.”  A high modernist ideology, 
Scott maintained, was a 19th and early 20th century faith in scientific progress, the expansion 
of production, the growing satisfaction of human needs, the mastery of nature, and above all, 
the rational design of a new social order.22  High modernism, however, even when its carriers 
were believers in the sanctity of market forces, required state action to sweep away barriers to 
capitalism.  The establishment of towns, rural to urban migration, overseas extraction, and the 
extension of private property all required government intervention.  As well, The Economist’s 
obsession with the collection of agricultural statistics indicated one of the ways in which state 
action would increase in the English countryside.  It was through statistics that the rural 
population and their land use would be made available to the state.  The legibility produced 
out of this knowledge would allow state officials to characterize the population in new ways, 
                                               
22
 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 4, 89-90. 
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make them available to economic calculation, and expose remaining barriers to capitalism.  
From a description of the countryside, it was but a small step for the paper to advocate a new 
design for agricultural production, all with its improvement in mind.23 
Changes in agricultural production were a key area in which transformations were 
needed in order to cement capitalist relations of production.  The Economist was concerned 
with improving and increasing agricultural production, but only in certain ways.  It was a 
passionate advocate of ‘high farming’ – a modern, industrialized, production and profit-driven 
system of agriculture.  This system, according to the paper, relied on free trade in agriculture, 
huge imports of fertilizer, mechanization, and large landholdings that employed significant 
amounts of capital.  High farming was clearly designed to dispossess the smallholders who 
lacked the means to farm ‘highly’.  This capitalist mode of production limited access to land 
and separated the rural poor from their means of subsistence, forcing them to become wage 
labourers.  Yet the paper argued that a capitalist mode of production came about naturally and 
would ultimately benefit the rural poor.  Its contradictions became most evident in its 
vehement opposition to any measure, such as small garden allotments, that would alleviate 
rural poverty or lessen class differences in the countryside.   
The Economist claimed that once people were ‘freed’ from their ties to the land they 
naturally sought to profit and to increase their own well-being.  Rational people, it argued, 
understood the benefits of wage labour.  The paper maintained the rural poor’s ignorance of 
their own misery and failure to conform to wage labour was evidence of their inadequate 
rationality and moral defectiveness.  A labour force disciplined to the market did not, 
however, emerge spontaneously.  Dispossession of land was necessary, but it was often not 
sufficient in harnessing the rural poor to the labour market.24  Nor was it sufficient in 
constructing a common and rational consciousness on which the success of capitalism 
                                               
23
 Scott, pp. 92, 96. 
24
 Perelman, p. 14. 
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depended; a host of disciplines designed to undermine resistance against the demands of wage 
labour were required.  It was a function of the modern state to shape the mentality of the 
population as a whole in accordance with a predetermined model, and to instill the ideas and 
sentiments it thought desirable into the minds of all.25   
It is here I use Michel Foucault’s concept of “governmentality” to understand how the 
rural poor were to be integrated into the market economy.  Foucault presented government as 
an ‘art’, as a way of acting on and governing the conduct of a population so as to shape, 
guide, and correct their actions.  He argued this modern form of governance took shape in 
Western Europe between the late 16th and 18th centuries, becoming fully developed in the 19th.  
He maintained the state’s increased concern with productivity and the well-being of the 
population was a central characteristic of the modern state; this approach differed from the 
state’s earlier concern with controlling territory.  Controlling people required more subtlety 
and discreetness, thus governmentality, Foucault noted, was not imposed on a population, but 
was cultivated in people through particular ‘disciplinary mechanisms’ or ‘techniques of 
government’ which would instill self-discipline and construct ‘proper’ or ‘good’ citizens.  It 
was not authority over people, but the fostering of their happiness, health, and prosperity that 
became the object of government.26 
The rural poor’s stubborn reliance on traditional solidarities, refusal to relinquish 
control of the organization of their survival, and their limited material needs made them 
incapable of being incorporated into a modern society dominated by the market.  These 
characteristics also excluded them from being considered acceptable citizens.27  They were 
thus in need of intervention and discipline to guide their conduct.  The Economist worked in a 
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governmentality fashion by promoting education, ‘decent’ homes, and a strict administration 
of the Poor Law as beneficial for the rural poor.  These were techniques of government, 
spaces that would shape and transform the rural poor into governable citizens – citizens that 
could be integrated into a modern national economy.  Nevertheless, it was not the rural poor 
who were The Economist’s audience; rather, it sought to convince those who read the paper, 
those with power – government and business leaders – of the need to stand firm, to not 
succumb to sympathy for the rural poor, and to work to ensure that they had no option but to 
embrace the new rationality of wage labour.  The Economist hoped to restrict the rural poor’s 
ability to promote “counter-conducts”, as Foucault termed it, or different forms of behaviour 
that were not amenable to capitalist relations of production.28   
The Economist repeatedly obscured the significant role of state power in capitalist 
development.  It insisted that changes in the English countryside were voluntary, normal, a 
neutral affair, and a natural progression toward an advanced stage of civilization.  By 
claiming that capitalist development benefited everyone, the paper made any opposition 
appear futile and foolish in the face of inevitable progress.  In all, The Economist made an 
unnatural system seem natural.  This position was essential to build support for capitalism; 
that this position could explain so much social injustice as an inevitable incident in the 
scheme of improvement, and that, as the paper argued, any attempts to change such things 
would likely do more harm than good, gave it authority.29   
This thesis contends that The Economist’s vision of rural change required external and 
nonmarket factors: relief of land and resource constraints beyond Britain’s borders, increased 
state action in the countryside, and the techniques of government to form acceptable citizens.  
This thesis, therefore, illuminates the relationships of power built into the paper’s 
improvement discourse and illustrates the conditions and policies necessary for the emergence 
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of capitalism.  It maintains that the narrative of improvement and the story of modern 
progress was based on exploitations and injustices, experienced primarily in the countryside, 
that were fundamental to the development of capitalism.  What follows is a brief history of 
The Economist, the historical context in which it was founded, and the method by which it 
was written.  
A Brief History of The Economist 
The Economist’s founder and first editor, James Wilson, was a hat maker who was 
greatly influenced by the works of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and other classical political 
economists.  At the base of classical economic belief lay the conviction that all benefited from 
free competition and that government interference in economic affairs upset the natural 
checks and balances of wealth creation.  This laissez faire political economy, in contrast to the 
old ‘moral economy’ of regulation and ideals such as a just price and the proper reward for 
labour, laid claim to a superior rationale, to a scientific grasp of wealth creation and an 
endorsement of ‘natural’ economic forces.  With its intellectual underpinnings in the 
Enlightenment, political economy rationalized self-interest and individualism; it legitimized a 
capitalist society in terms of human nature, desire, and individual freedom.  Demonstrating 
how self-enrichment could be socially cohesive, political economy fused burgeoning 
capitalism and social order into a single discourse.30   
According to Scott Gordon in his article, “The London Economist and the High Tide 
of Laissez Faire”, the effort to disseminate the principles of political economy among the 
working classes began around 1820, mainly due to discussions over the Poor Laws and the 
growing trade union movement.31  Wilson was disturbed by the growing interference of 
government: the Factory Act of 1833 and the Mines Act of 1842 which regulated hours of 
labour, the establishment of a central Poor Law Commission that would administer poor relief 
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under the New Poor Law of 1834 and, after 1839, the Privy Council Committee on Education, 
all increased the role of government.32  After 1820, the nature of the political economist’s 
argument was that, by protection, the agricultural classes benefited at the expense of other 
parts of the community, and the effort was made to show that this was illicit or unjust.  As 
Wilson contended, “nothing [could] possibly be favourable to the whole that [was] 
detrimental to a part, and nothing [could] be detrimental to one portion that [was] favourable 
to another portion.”33  A clear economic theory became important in the argument that free 
trade would benefit everyone, including the agricultural classes.   
Wilson joined the Anti-Corn Law League where he became known as a “great belief 
producer” after writing a pamphlet in 1839 on the Influences of the Corn Laws – essentially a 
plea for free trade.34  Wilson quickly gained admirers and became sought after for counsel, 
however, it was primarily in print as a persuader and recruiter of influential people that he 
made his greatest contribution to the anti-Corn Law campaign.35  In 1843 he stepped out on 
his own and began The Economist which would be of assistance to the League in influencing 
public opinion and forming a legislative party to pursue, first, repeal of the Corn Laws and, 
then, “the long train of measures and policy, necessarily involved in free-trade principles.”36   
The Economist’s idol was Adam Smith and its ideology laissez faire.  Wilson believed 
that once the principle of free trade had been established universally then progress and order 
would be continuous.  In The Economist he argued that “laissez faire [was] the true and only 
policy” and not limited only to trade or business but applied to all human relations.  It was, in 
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other words, not merely an economic doctrine but a complete metaphysics, the foundation 
upon which all policy should be founded.37  “The more we give or allow scope to the free 
exercise of self-love, the more complete will be social order,” the paper remarked.38  Indeed, 
The Economist maintained that the self interest of each merchant and trader led to a system of 
order such as no government could ever conceive or enforce.  It was the interference of 
governments that was anarchy, as was the case in France, where the government had scarcely 
left any branch of industry free, resulting in poverty, misery, and anarchy.  Governments’ 
proper and only function, the paper argued, was to protect property and person.39  The passion 
of regulating everything had become quite a mania.  “It is a part of the general want of faith 
which characterizes the age, and which will acknowledge nothing but what it sees and feels 
and makes,” it claimed.40  As Christian Socialist thought made headway in the mid-19th 
century, The Economist’s main objection to the Socialists’ proposed scheme of co-operative 
associations and educated-class humanitarianism, was simply that they lacked faith in the 
order and progressive improvement of a competitive society.  They were, the paper stated, a 
class of writers  
continually boasting of their spirituality, of their great mental acquisitions, and 
continually deriding the cold selfishness of merchants, manufacturers, and other 
patient workers, distinguish themselves by a hard material skepticism, and deny the 
existence of order unless they can see and feel the regulations for calling it into 
existence.41 
 
“But,” The Economist assured its readers, “order prevails; and it is a hard and a vulgar kind of 
materialism to doubt or deny the existence of order because it has not been prescribed by act 
of Parliament.”42  In an 1844 article the paper argued that “the great practical lesson, which 
society has at present to learn, is that our greatest social inconveniences, though caused by 
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laws, are to be cured only by an utter absence of legislation.”43  The fundamental basis of The 
Economist’s laissez faire doctrine was faith in natural law, in a natural harmony between 
individual self-interest and the happiness of the community.44 
Wilson’s prospectus for The Economist lamented the legislation and restrictions which 
obstructed Britain’s progress.  According to Wilson, the public mind was confused and 
ignorant as no class had been taught the principles of feeding the country, of conducting 
commerce, or of securing national prosperity.45  Wilson’s Economist was to become a 
significant force in shaping public opinion over some of the most pressing social issues of its 
day.  The paper overwhelmingly represented and articulated the point of view of the energetic 
upper echelons of the middle class, gaining a high reputation among them.  The middle 
classes of the late 18th and early 19th centuries were represented as the agents of progress and 
the bearers of the nascent market economy.46  The Economist, in 1847, felt that the landed 
interest was still averse to sound economical legislation, “but, they ha[d] succumbed to the 
organized and intelligent power of the middle classes.”47  Moreover, the paper argued, “only 
men in possession of some degree of leisure, or who [could] derive a living from their 
exertions, [could] attend to politics or the sciences.”48  The bulk of the public could devote no 
time to reflect on such subjects, and they naturally and necessarily, in any suffering, eagerly 
grasped at every prospect of relief.  Against their too great eagerness, statesmen firmly 
adhering to principle were expected to form a barrier.  Without that, the paper remarked, it 
was clear that the empire would “soon be wholly governed by the most ignorant, most 
clamorous, and most unreflecting.”49  The Economist claimed that a leisure or opulent class 
was necessary to lead society forward, to point out the dangers in its path and protect its best 
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interests.50  The development of the economic system, Wilson thought, rested in the hands of 
the industrious middle classes, and the only hope he saw for the working classes was their 
ultimate elevation to the middle classes.  An increase in the middle classes was to be the result 
of the union of capital, enterprise, labour, new inventions and more machinery.  Wilson did 
not believe the conditions of workers could be improved by legislative fiat, but rather by an 
increase in production which would permit a higher standard of living.51   
While the general ‘truths’ of political economy were well known to educated persons, 
every now and then, the paper noted, some circumstance occurred which proved that this 
knowledge had not penetrated deep into the mass of the community.52  “Comments of the 
press” and the “sure progress of opinion,” The Economist maintained, would assist in 
educating the masses on the principles of political economy.53  Undeniably, the press and 
printed materials had been crucial to the Enlightenment and in forming a print culture.  
Prominent in the print explosion were newspapers.  Read in London’s coffee houses and with 
nearly every town in England publishing its own, newspapers were public platforms for 
staging and spreading modern ideas and values.  The multitude of newspapers, their 
cheapness, and the variety of their news articles brought them into universal use.54  Higher 
journalism and quality newspapers – the more dignified, intellectual organs of opinion such as 
The Economist – were a characteristic of 19th century Britain and it was within them that 
discussion of economic ideas and theories often took place.55  According to E. L. Woodward, 
a contributor to the paper’s Centenary Volume, the scope and purpose of The Economist 
illustrated the demand for a practical application of the new type of scientific knowledge.56   
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Wilson became a member of the British parliament and The Economist became a 
propaganda organ for the governments in which he served.  By the late 1840s he had 
substantial help with writing and producing the paper as his political responsibilities left him 
little time to write.57  The people connected with The Economist during this period were 
leading proponents of political economy in the 19th century: Thomas Hodgskin and Herbert 
Spencer were sub-editors until Richard Holt Hutton took over as editor from 1857 to 1861.  In 
1859 Wilson accepted the Vice-Presidency of the Board of Trade and became a Privy 
Councillor.  Soon after, he was offered the job of Financial Member of the Council of India 
where he set in motion important financial reforms.  During Wilson’s 13 years in parliament, 
all but three of them in office, his status grew steadily.  He died in India in 1860 at which time 
his son-in-law, Walter Bagehot, became editor.  From 1861 to his death in 1877, Bagehot 
broadened the paper and made it a powerful force in the business world.58   
The Economist gained a high reputation and was read in the corridors of power by 
government leaders, civil servants, and the professional classes.  It both reflected and shaped 
the consciousness of the new capitalist classes in Britain and North America.  Its average 
weekly circulation reached nearly 2,000 in 1843 and settled around 3,500 for the next few 
years.  While this was below the circulation figures of many other newspapers, the size of 
circulation was not the only gauge of a newspaper’s importance.  The Economist was read by 
those in the best position to formulate and implement political and economic policies.59  What 
gave The Economist its primary appeal to men of business was what Bagehot described as 
Wilson’s habit of “always beginning with the facts, always arguing from the facts, and always 
ending with a result applicable to the facts.”60  Wilson strongly believed that reason had been 
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given to man to sit in judgment over the dictates of his feelings.61  In his time, an ‘economist’ 
applied to anyone who approached problems by putting every argument to the test of the 
facts.  The Economist would go on to campaign for free trade, laissez faire, and individual 
responsibility through the medium of rational analysis applied to facts.62   
The Economist’s Writing Style 
The Economist’s writing style contributed to its influence and to the framework 
through which issues were comprehended.  The paper claimed its readers wanted to know 
only the ‘facts’.  As it established an orderly, authorless narrative it appeared to be the voice 
of reason and an objective source, detached from the world.  While its text was presented as if 
it were a transparent window on the world, its news articles were not entirely objective; 
rather, they were constructed to reflect the paper’s ideology.  The Economist ensured that the 
process of constructing articles – the selection, presentation, built-in assumptions, the relative 
importance given to different factors, and the fact that news itself is a cultural artifact – was 
masked.  While the paper’s sophisticated articles often contained a range of perspectives and 
discourses, these were arranged in a hierarchy with The Economist’s perspective having 
priority and being the most authoritative.  Less-valued voices were associated with particular 
individuals, or “nominated”, while the most dominant voice, and the one the reader was 
invited to agree with as the most objective, was not associated with any particular individual, 
and so was “exnominated.”  Exnomination put an emotional distance between the paper and 
its subject matter as did The Economist’s often slightly ironic tone, which made grim reality 
more palatable, less tragic, and more distant.  The paper elevated calculative rationality and 
‘hard science’ above emotion, sentiment, soft-mindedness, or any subjective form of 
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knowledge.  Being bold and aggressive on one hand, and measured and rational on the other, 
The Economist appeared to be tough-minded but objective.63   
The Economist’s writing style gave tremendous weight to the paper, shoring up respect 
for its supposed truthfulness and its status.  In a scientific, authoritative, and sophisticated 
method, The Economist cut through complexity, producing order, coherence, and unity out of 
a fragmented, multifaceted social world.64  Graham Hutton, an editor of the paper, maintained 
that The Economist quickly created for itself a position of peculiar international authority.  “It 
spoke not only for that mentality which in Britain was becoming decisive, but also for an 
international mentality, a view of the world.”65  The Economist’s ideological position, its view 
of the world, was endlessly repeated, promoted, legitimated, and above all, naturalized.  Its 
particular vision of progress prevailed over other possible views and indeed made them 
difficult to conceive of.  What The Economist proposed was portrayed as reasonable while 
those who did not adhere to its views were often ridiculed, depicted as ignorant and 
unreasonable, and accused of standing in the way of progress.   
Thesis Outline 
The Economist reflected and advanced a particular notion of improvement that was 
first articulated during the Enlightenment.  The rural poor, with their attachment to tradition, 
pre-capitalist social formations, and independence from the market, were especially a threat to 
capitalist development.  This thesis, therefore, examines The Economist’s obsession with 
improvement in the English countryside.   
Chapter one sets the stage with an examination of The Economist’s Enlightenment 
view of nature and its high modernist ideology.  In its support for urbanization, enclosures, 
deforestation, scientific experiment, and a reformed system of property, the paper advocated 
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policies that would clear away long-held traditions and pave the way for a capitalist mode of 
production.  This chapter addresses the increased state action that was needed in the 
countryside to accomplish these changes and to make the rural population legible. 
Chapter two explores The Economist’s promotion of a capitalist mode of agricultural 
production.  It contends that the system of high agriculture the paper supported was 
productive only in a liberal economic sense.  It exposes The Economist’s contradictions and 
argues it was not willing to rely completely on the market to organize production.  A capitalist 
mode of production needed government measures that would drive the rural poor from the 
land, force them to become wage labourers, and prevent any return to self-provisioning.   
Chapter three highlights how the rural poor were to be reformed and integrated in a 
market economy through the techniques of government.  Though The Economist argued 
rational people understood the benefits of wage labour and naturally complied with the 
discipline of the market, this chapter argues that education, reconstructed homes, and a strict 
administration of the Poor Law were sites of governmentality that disciplined and shaped the 
rural poor’s interests and ways of thinking and being.  This chapter explores how ‘good’ 
citizens were constructed.   
This thesis concludes that The Economist was (and is) one of the most dangerous 
newspapers in the world, for it obfuscated the process of capitalist development and helped 
make the inequality and poverty that was an essential component of the emergence of 
capitalism more acceptable.  The Economist was influential in creating and disseminating an 
enduring version of capitalism that has shaped our modern world – a capitalism that appeared 
to emerge out of an enlightened, progressive, and rational domain.  Its articles molded the 
attitudes and conduct of those who would be responsible for spearheading the far-reaching 
developments that would transform the English countryside and grow to encompass much of 
the world.   
22 
CHAPTER ONE - Removing the Barriers to Capitalism 
Nature was a key concept of the Enlightenment and its proponents were preoccupied 
with rethinking man’s place in it.  Advances in science gave a greater understanding of the 
natural world and prompted an unprecedented desire and ability to use and control the forces 
of nature.  The biblical mandate to master the earth was rationalized; man’s right, his duty 
even, was to harness and improve nature, producing order, uniformity and profit.  These 
Enlightenment views of nature underpinned the ploughing, planting, mining, draining, and 
deforestation of Europe, all praised for turning nature’s resources into wealth.  Throughout 
the 18th and 19th centuries new managerial approaches to nature, new instructional literature 
on agricultural improvement, and farming on sound scientific principles were widely 
promoted.  The idea that Europeans lived outside of nature and dominated and shaped it 
through their ingenuity became prominent.  It was an age when Europe’s mastery over nature 
was being ever more confidently proclaimed.1   
The Economist added its influential voice to this anthem.  It espoused an 
Enlightenment view of nature and articulated a high modernist ideology – a confidence about 
the development of scientific knowledge, the expansion of production, and increased control 
over nature to bring about a new rational order.2  In the name of improvement it championed 
vast changes in the countryside: a shifting of labour from agriculture to industry, enclosure of 
common land, deforestation, scientific experiment, and a private property regime that enabled 
– it insisted – more productive use of the land.  The paper argued these transformations came 
about naturally as society advanced, and were beneficial for the whole country.   
This chapter contends these changes did not make any sense, nor did they occur 
naturally.  The state played an essential role in the paper’s high modernist vision.  One of the 
most important functions of the modern state was to map the countryside and make the rural 
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population legible.  The collection of agricultural statistics, which The Economist was 
obsessed with for nearly two decades, would allow the state to ‘see’ where barriers to 
capitalism still remained. 
European Exceptionalism 
“European exceptionalism” or the “European miracle” was the idea that Europe, 
because of its internally generated historical superiority, naturally progressed ahead of all 
other societies and was an example to be extended to the rest of the world.  This idea began in 
the 16th and 17th centuries in Western Europe, where a belief system was being constructed to 
give coherence to the new rationality within Europe and colonial expansion outside Europe.  
By the 19th century a number of theories for Europe’s exceptionalism emerged, or became 
concrete, which justified and assisted vast changes at home and abroad.  They included the 
postulates that Europeans were of superior heredity and rationality, as well as explanations 
that they progressed because of their superior institution of private property, technological 
innovations, the rise of European cities, and increased trade. 
Another dominant theory was based on geographic and climatic explanations – on the 
belief that societies could be understood within the context of their natural environments.  It 
was argued that Europeans were more advanced and complex because of their temperate 
climate and barren soils; a rigorous climate, it was believed, led to an enterprising nature and 
higher degree of exertion.3  Other societies were constrained by their tropical or unvarying 
climates and their fertile, easily-cultivated soils.  These environmental factors supposedly 
accounted for their mental flabbiness, feebleness, laziness and, thus, their lack of progress.4  
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To this was added the 19th century understanding that societies progressed through stages, 
beginning with hunting and gathering, moving on to agriculture, and ending in a stage of 
commerce whereby they had successfully mastered nature.  It was argued that within the 
agrarian stage, most of the population was dependent on local lords and restrained by 
tradition.  Europe’s good fortune, historian David Landes claimed, lay in its increased 
freedom from these rigidities.  Europe’s cities, he maintained, were “gateways to freedom, 
holes in the tissue of bondage that covered the countryside.”5  Within Europe’s cities 
merchants were able to develop institutions to protect private property and allow the market to 
operate freely.  Overall, proponents of European exceptionalism believed other societies had 
been moulded by their environments and were still governed by them, while Europe, though 
less favourably endowed, had by virtue of its industry and urbanization broken free of the 
shackles of climatic constraint.  Europe had learnt, as other societies apparently had not, how 
to compensate for nature’s ‘deficiencies’, and by mastering nature, had become civilized and 
prosperous.6   
The Economist gave expression to these widely felt attitudes.  Its disdain for the 
countryside as a backward place, hindering Britain’s progress, was couched in environmental 
determinist terms.  The Economist claimed it was a general rule that a very fertile soil did not 
foster an industrious people.  The Mexicans, it mentioned as one example, obtained an “easy 
subsistence by the great productiveness of maize and plantains, [grew] up in idleness, and 
[were] now and then by a famine scourged off the earth.”  Likewise, the Irish, procuring for a 
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long period an easy subsistence by the growth of the potato, failed to acquire habits of 
industry, and were overtaken by calamity.  In like manner, the population of the fertile plains 
of South America obtained an easy subsistence from the rapid multiplication of vast herds of 
cattle, and, “delighting in wild freedom . . . acquired only habits of strife and rapine, and 
[knew] nothing of that steady industry which [won] from Nature all her most useful gifts.”  In 
agriculture, the paper noted, nature spontaneously bestowed very large rewards on 
comparatively small toil while in manufactures nature’s rewards could not be obtained 
without great toil.  The Economist proposed that, as the rule, the British agricultural classes, 
from having more done for them by nature than the other classes, would be less energetic and 
less regularly and steadily industrious.  “In fact, we find them so, and they are complained of 
as being behind the rest of the community.”  The Economist looked for men of energy and 
action amongst those who had a living to get or a fortune to make, not amongst those who 
were amply and easily provided for as they would “in the long run, be overshadowed by those 
who acquire[d] strength from buffeting with Nature or with fortune for greatness.”7  It argued 
that merchants, manufacturers, and engineers were the men who made fortunes while those 
still employed in the cultivation of the soil were “avowedly the most wretched and ignorant 
portion” of Britain’s population.  The paper maintained that if people were to be directed to 
some particular pursuits with reference to their future improvement, town occupations were 
much more likely to be profitable than directing additional hands to cultivating the soil.8   
The Economist thus determined that agriculturalists, because they did not force nature 
to do their bidding, were less fit than industrialists.  In turn, nature apparently had its own 
rewards and punishments: the industrious town-dwellers prospered while the indolent 
agriculturalists suffered.  By establishing that rural Britain was subject to nature to a far 
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greater degree than the towns, the paper set out to prove its inferiority and backwardness, and 
hence, too, the need to bring about its improvement – to separate rural Britain further from 
nature.  This discourse was essential to building support for capitalism for it allowed the paper 
to imagine itself as helping to elevate people, while actually creating scarcities and poverty by 
limiting people’s access to natural wealth.9   
According to The Economist, the growth of towns in Britain was coincident with the 
progress and improvement of society.  Town-dwellers were “like good soldiers, wrestling 
against the ills of life – forcing fire and air and water and gravity and electricity to do their 
bidding – and gaining a great victory over want and poverty and destitution.”  They 
conquered nature, The Economist pointed out, and whatever stood in the way of their success 
had to yield sooner or later.  “To complain of defeats resulting from the laws of Nature [was] 
as idle as to complain of the wind and the rain.”10  In arguing that town-dwellers had a 
disposition and capacity for improving their own condition, The Economist reiterated the 
views of Adam Smith.  He proposed that profit-seeking was human nature and held that a 
commercial society gave this natural propensity “to truck, barter and exchange” free rein.  
Industrialization and urbanization, therefore, he claimed, brought a whole new and superior 
form of freedom – that of liberty under the law, a true hallmark of civilization.  Freed from 
dependence on a lord or ties to a place, individuals in a commercial society came to enjoy an 
independence unique to the modern market.  Smith maintained that human nature’s tendency 
to seek profit justified an urban commercial society.11  As a result, not only the environment, 
but human nature could explain why cities were best.   
                                               
9
 Perelman, p. 102. 
10
 “Why is There a Deficient Town Population in Ireland?”, The Economist, April 18, 1846, pp. 499-501; 
“Apparent Decline of the Landed Interest,” The Economist, July 2, 1853, pp. 728-729. 
11
 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, edited by R. H. Campbell and 
A. S. Skinner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), pp. 30, 412.  Porter refers to this aspect of Smith’s work at some 
length in pp. 388-392. 
27 
The Economist endeavoured to show that urbanization not only produced freedom and 
civilization, but generated vast economic advantages beneficial to all, including the rural 
classes.  It claimed that towns stimulated and assisted agriculture: railroads allowed farmers to 
send their produce to rich markets and neighbouring towns supplied the means of high 
cultivation.  Where manufacture was energetic and commerce enterprising, the farmer found 
the greatest profit and the landowner received the highest rent.12  Indeed, if the manufactures 
and commerce of a country were in a flourishing condition, The Economist argued, the whole 
labour of the community would flourish with it.  Husbandry had followed the commercial 
progress of the country, though with unequal and lagging steps, and had partaken largely of 
the benefits derived from extended commerce and important advances in manufacturing.13    
The paper claimed towns also relieved the agricultural class as a body and land as a 
property from taxes and ‘surplus’ population.14  The Economist proposed that every additional 
person removed from the rural districts, where his labour was not required, to the 
manufacturing districts, where he could be profitably employed, and where his increased 
consumption of commodities would contribute to state revenue, benefited the whole 
country.15  It was a sign of progress to produce more food by less labour, the paper insisted.  
Such had been the progress in England where draining, the use of improved machinery, the 
multiplication of artificial crops, and the system of scientific agriculture had within the last 30 
years more than doubled the produce of agricultural labour.  The increased quantity of grain 
grown and the decreased proportion of the people devoted to agricultural pursuits had already 
“broken down the parochial and patriarchal barriers which made each spot of the land a gaol, 
though a home, for a particular portion of the community, and the same progress will cause 
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them to be entirely removed,” The Economist declared.16  According to the paper, England’s 
urbanization had been the country’s ‘gateway to freedom’.  Not only in England, but 
everywhere and at all times, The Economist claimed, the necessary subsistence of the human 
race had been obtained by a diminishing quantity of labour on the land as society advanced.17   
The paper maintained that towns were not only beneficial for everyone, but their 
growth was due to a law of nature.  The congregations of men into masses, professing various 
arts, working together and helping one another, as only contiguous men could, were 
“according to the order of nature and essential to the progress of society.”18  The Economist 
denounced those who advocated returning to the land, whose main principle, it argued, “was 
opposition to all natural progress.”  For the paper, the movement to towns was spontaneous, 
thus natural.  The Economist criticized those who had a notion that everything spontaneous 
was evil and aimed at stifling it.  This class was “now mourning over the increase of towns-
people, and would drive them back into an agricultural arcadia of their own fancy,” the paper 
claimed.  These “sages” counseled the people amiss and “would divert them from the course 
of improvement they have entered on to become something like pauper occupants of small 
allotments of land, or inhabitants of self-sustaining villages.”19  The only safe way, The 
Economist claimed, to determine if employment and food could be best obtained directly by 
cultivating the soil or by producing other commodities which could be exchanged with other 
countries for food, was to leave capital and labour perfectly free to be employed in the manner 
that private enterprise would find to result in the greatest profit.20  Besides, it was evident, the 
paper argued, that no charity would suffice to keep down the deluge of pauperism which was 
flowing in upon the towns from the country.   
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This was a nonsensical argument, for the measures The Economist advocated, 
explored more fully below and in the next chapter, increased pauperism in the countryside 
and forced rural to urban migration (as similar measures have done since everywhere in the 
guise of development).  For the paper, the increase in pauperism was, therefore, not an 
indication that agrarian change should be held back, slowed down, or rethought, but rather it 
reinforced the necessity of going even further and faster in agrarian change to allow industry 
to soak up these paupers.  The Economist repeatedly argued the only hope lay in cheap bread, 
extended commerce, enlarged manufactures, and the increase of a town population.  To 
narrow those means was “to stop up the safety-valve of the machine.”21  Indeed, “it was folly, 
not to say injustice, of attempting to encourage agriculture at the expense of the 
manufacturing and trading community.”22   
The Economist claimed it was through the growth of a town population that “the future 
progress of comfort, of luxury, of art and science [were] provided for, and those who [were] 
hurt by the inevitable consequences, should look before them and get out of the way.”  It 
argued landowners and farmers were naturally diminished as society advanced; they were 
“injured in much the same manner as the Indians [were] injured by the growth of a much 
more skilful and powerful people than themselves in the territory they exclusively occupied a 
few centuries ago.”23  Happily for the farmers and landowners, and for the world, The 
Economist maintained, their arbitrary self-will and political power had been curbed by the 
silent growth of towns, and because of this growth, England was gaining in freedom and 
prosperity.24   
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‘Collecting wealth into heaps and population into dense masses’ 
A phrase in The Economist by Mr. William Trotter, a British farmer, perhaps most 
accurately describes the general tendency of the age, “which [was] that of collecting wealth 
into heaps, and of population into dense masses.”25  This was exactly what the paper proposed 
in its support for urbanization.  The Economist justified dispossession, depopulation, and a 
transfer of wealth with the argument that because agriculturalists did not manipulate nature, 
they were less fit, backward, and lacked the necessary stimulus to work and accumulate 
wealth; they were thus naturally overtaken by a stronger, more industrious class of town-
dwellers.  The paper also justified urbanization by claiming it was the result of rational human 
behaviour, and it promoted further urban growth by arguing that civilization, freedom, and 
progress required shifting ‘unproductive’ labour from the countryside to the city, from 
agriculture to industry.  The Economist claimed urbanization was beneficial for everyone: 
‘surplus’ rural labour found employment in manufactures, the countryside was relieved of 
paupers and taxes, agriculture was improved, and wealth was created in England’s dynamic 
towns.  To intervene in the “natural tendency of increasing wealth and prosperity,” would in 
fact do more harm than good, The Economist maintained.26   
Yet there was nothing natural or inevitable about the exodus from the countryside.  
The process of primitive accumulation had been going on for some time; by the 18th century 
much of Britain’s land had been expropriated from the rural poor and was concentrated into 
fewer and fewer hands.  Government measures, such as the enclosure of common land, forced 
migration to urban areas.  Moreover, towns, central to The Economist’s theory of economic 
development, did not develop spontaneously but began as artificial units that were granted 
specific privileges by the state.  Towns were often formed around an industry that was 
allowed special liberties.  As new wealth from colonial conquests and foreign trade provided 
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capital for investment in manufacturing, capital shifted much of its activity to places such as 
Leeds, Liverpool, and Manchester, where it could be less encumbered by traditional labour 
regulations.27  Towns were also dependent on developments in road and rail transport.  The 
state, therefore, played a significant role in urbanization.  It formed the preconditions for a 
market economy and was an active agent in the economy, encouraging the growth of new 
industries and providing a protected home market in the 18th century.  Thus the mobility of 
labour was not due to natural market forces, but involved issues of state power and policy.28   
State power was also needed to wield military power to secure foreign markets.  
Britain’s traditional system of food production had been weakened by the second half of the 
18th century, and population growth, coupled with the process of primitive accumulation, 
resulted in the British becoming increasingly dependent on imported grain.  That The 
Economist proposed it would be beneficial to remove most of the country’s food producers 
from the land at a time when Britain could no longer feed itself seems an unreasonable 
proposition.  Becoming dependent on other countries for food involved no less than an act of 
faith and forcing the migration of thousands of small producers did not help agriculture, but 
furthered the process of primitive accumulation, turning the rural poor into even poorer urban 
dwellers.   
Repeatedly, The Economist extolled town life as the source and centre of progress, 
providing the conditions of a civilized life.  It confidently suggested that “modern towns 
[were] great wonders and great blessings . . . the home of advancing civilization, the abodes 
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of genius, and the centres of all the knowledge, the arts, and the science of our race.”29  
Likewise, many historians and economists who examined standards of living, as 
conventionally understood in terms of real wages, also contributed to the belief that the 
surplus rural population that migrated to cities in Britain during the 18th and early 19th 
centuries became better off.  Because real wages were estimated to be higher in large urban 
areas, they contended that city dwellers enjoyed an increased standard of living.  Some also 
suggested that the increased consumption of imported goods such as coffee, tea and sugar was 
an indication of a rising standard of living.30   
Yet conditions in England’s cities were not so civilized.  The people forced to inhabit 
them dealt with squalid living conditions, poor sanitation, excessive disease, high death rates, 
and segregation according to income and status.31  Horrified foreign visitors commented that 
England’s great towns were places of crime, prostitution, and of “smoke, dirt and bustle” that 
“deformed the face of nature.”32  Moreover, income was not a reliable indicator of standard of 
living.  According to examinations of nutritional indicators such as the height of recruits into 
the British Army and Royal Marines and height of English and Irish male convicts transported 
to Australia, rural dwellers were better nourished than urban dwellers.  The average height of 
both rural and urban workers declined after 1780, but this decline was much more significant 
among urban dwellers and especially among urban-born Englishmen who were shorter than 
Irish and Scottish soldiers and Irish convicts.33  This suggests that food security was 
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decreasing during the time The Economist claimed scientific agriculture had dramatically 
improved production with less agricultural labour.  Furthermore, the increased consumption 
of stimulants such as sugar and coffee by England’s industrial workforce could be seen to be 
the result of falling prices for these imported goods.  It is plausible that this consumption was 
also associated with the increased unavailability of healthy food such as the dairy products 
and vegetables produced by small-scale farmers – the result, discussed more fully in the next 
chapter, of a system of agriculture that dispossessed smallholders.34  
The Economist argued the evils of cities were exaggerated and maintained that 
“abodes of poverty and vice” formed only a small portion of England’s towns.  When a Public 
Health Bill was introduced in 1848, the paper vehemently opposed it, arguing that the 
consequences of such benevolent law-making were mental and moral stupor.  Reacting to the 
proposal that a board be made responsible for the public welfare, The Economist argued that  
the mental imbecility which is everywhere produced in the masses by such subversion 
. . . seem to us far greater evils than the perpetuation of bad smells, and generation of 
partial diseases, suppose they were the inevitable consequence of non-interference by 
authorities with the dwellings of the multitude.35   
 
The paper wished to avoid what it saw as the over-regulation and centralization of Paris’ 
sanitary reform.  If the bill became law it feared the English would “bid adieu to neighbourly 
peace, enterprise, and individual improvement.”  The Economist was quite happy to argue for 
bad sanitation rather than the moral degradation of centralization.36   
It is in the paper’s hostility towards the health bill that its contradictions become clear.  
While government intervention was needed to establish towns and to force a migration of the 
rural poor to urban areas, The Economist, as a proponent of laissez faire, needed to argue that 
urbanization was a natural occurrence that benefited everyone, including the rural poor.  Yet 
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once the rural poor became even poorer urban dwellers, the paper fiercely fought against 
measures that would improve their condition.  
Reclaiming the ‘rural and moral wildernesses’ 
In its anti-rural rhetoric The Economist set up urban areas as places of progress and the 
countryside as a place in need of improvement.  One of the first areas that needed to be 
improved was any remaining common land.  Common or waste land was used by villagers for 
pasturage or cultivation; they had rights and access to the land without ownership of it.  For 
commoners, access to land and common right were the basis for their livelihood.  Improvers, 
however, deplored the “immoral independence” of commoners, the unimprovability of their 
pastures, and the constraint on production represented by shared property.  The main excuse 
improvers gave for enclosure of common land into private property was national 
improvement; the country would benefit from increased agricultural production, they 
argued.37  Beginning in the 16th century, land was enclosed into private property.  From the 
17th to the end of the 18th century, enclosures were combined with a fierce persecution of 
vagrancy, seen as necessary to control the poor and by taking away their access to common 
land, induce them to labour.38  Between 1750 and 1850, about a quarter of England’s land was 
transformed from common or waste land into private property.39  Though by the end of the 
18th century most of England’s common fields had been enclosed through acts of Parliament, 
in the 19th century there were final surges to enclose.40   
The Economist was committed to 19th century campaigns for enclosure.  Like the 
President of the Board of Agriculture, Sir John Sinclair, who put the origins of commons in 
                                               
37
 Pre-1750 enclosures typically changed land use from open arable fields into pastures.  After 1790, enclosures 
brought marginal land such as wastes, heaths and moors into cultivation.  See J. M. Neeson, Commoners: 
common right, enclosure and social change in England, 1700-1820 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), pp. 5, 7-11, 329, K. D. M. Snell, Annals of the labouring poor: social change and agrarian England, 1660-
1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), Ch. 4 and Boaz Moselle, “Allotments, enclosure, and 
proletarianization in early nineteenth-century southern England,” Economic History Review, 68 (3) (1995): 494.   
38
 Handy, The Menace of Progress, Ch. 2 and Polanyi, p. 104. 
39
 Ross, p. 14. 
40
 Turner, pp. 13, 32, 81. 
35 
the dark ages and saw them as an enemy to be beaten, The Economist argued one of the first 
steps in the emergence of a people from a barbarous condition was the severance of each 
man’s portion of land from that of his companions.  Without land as an exclusive possession, 
it claimed, men could not be induced to render it productive.41  The Economist also reiterated 
the views of John Locke, who in the 17th century, stressed that land which was wholly left to 
nature – that did not have the improvement of cultivation – was ‘waste’ and had no benefit.  
Commons, therefore, had no benefit for Locke pointed out how much more productive one 
acre of “inclosed and cultivated land” was than one acre “of an equal richnesse, lyeing wast in 
common.”42  Locke’s foremost argument for enclosure was the enormous advance in 
productivity private land enabled.  This, he argued, was reason enough for excluding any 
other rights to land.   
The Economist, too, argued a significant barrier to adding to the food and employment 
of England was the large quantity of waste land not in cultivation.  Wastes in mass were 
confined to certain districts, the paper noted, and generally had complex common rights 
which interfered with individual efforts to reclaim them.  Yet it was in reclaiming large 
commons – heaths or forests – that the advantages of such operations were most striking and 
attractive.  It was particularly disturbed by the “useless, unprofitable waste in the hands of the 
crown” of the New Forest in Hampshire.43  There could be no doubt, the paper argued, that by 
judicious management, the whole 65,992 acres of the New Forest might be let on long leases 
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to capitalists, who would deforest the land, bring it into cultivation, build farm buildings, and 
give an ample rental.44   
At the same time, there were many, perhaps the majority, of the large estates in Britain 
containing wastes the reclamation of which was also desirable.  The Economist was disgusted 
with landowners’ little inclination to reclaim the “rural and moral wilderness” their estates 
represented.  That such large portions of soil were out of the reach of improvement was a 
“national evil.”45  It was a necessity, in their current stage of civilization, the paper argued, 
that all the land of the nation be available for production; a commercial and industrious nation 
could no longer permit its soil to remain in a “half wilderness state.”46  It claimed that “the 
more they did, either in enclosing wastes or in giving a higher cultivation to the soil which 
was under tillage, the more they benefited the country at large.”47   
The Economist continually argued enclosures would increase productivity, which in 
turn, would benefit all.  Scarcity, it maintained, had awakened the community to the necessity 
of rendering the soil as productive as possible.  With a large, growing population to feed and 
high unemployment, the whole question of wastes was a critical one.  Where the people 
lacked food and employment, and where there was a large amount of unenclosed land, the 
paper argued it seemed the most obvious thing in the world to do to promote its severance and 
enclosure, in order to supply more of what was lacking.48  By crediting enclosures with 
creating dramatic increases in productivity and meeting the needs of a growing population, 
the paper made any opposition to them appear foolish. 
To this justification of enclosures The Economist added social discipline.  Like Arthur 
Young, one of the most active supporters of enclosure in the 18th century, who argued that 
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commoners were unproductive, lazy, and dangerous, the paper believed common land 
generated unemployment and idleness.49  The Economist claimed that isolated labour was of 
no benefit to the community – it was far less productive than labour when employed in 
connection with capital and in combination with other labourers under the superintendence of 
a capitalist of skill and enterprise.50  Enclosures would provide permanent employment for 
‘masterless men’, placing them under the watchful eye of the landholder.51   
While The Economist maintained that anyone who enclosed land in order to improve it 
enhanced the wealth of the nation, historian E. P. Thompson argues that agricultural 
improvement “was impelled less by altruistic desires to banish ugly wastes or – as the tedious 
phrase goes – to ‘feed a growing population’ than by the desire for fatter rent-rolls and larger 
profits.”52  Indeed, enclosures were not so much a means of increasing the productivity of 
land as part of a redistribution of income and a turnover in landowning away from small 
farmers to large landowners.  Enclosures broke existing leases, allowed rents to be 
renegotiated, and introduced free competition into the market for leases.53  Thompson 
concluded enclosures were “a plain enough case of class robbery.”54  They dispossessed 
commoners of rights and access to land and aided the creation of a more hierarchical rural 
society of large landed estates, tenant farmers, and a mass of landless labourers.55   
In a more recent assessment of enclosures, Robert Allen argues that large gains in 
agricultural productivity occurred before the parliamentary enclosures that began in Britain in 
1750; this significant increase in production, he maintained, was in fact a function of small 
farmers.  From 1740 to 1800, a period of intensive enclosure, output grew only 10 percent.  
Allen also claimed it was likely, if land, labour and capital were accounted for, that open 
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communal fields were more productive than enclosed fields.  Open fields were ideally suited 
to experimentation: furlongs rather than fields were the operating units, so land could be 
shifted to new or experimental uses in small quantities and new crops or techniques were not 
integrated broadly until they had proven to be beneficial.  Allen’s assessment, therefore, calls 
into question the importance of England’s enclosed, large, capitalized estates as a source of 
agricultural improvement and The Economist’s argument that land needed to be enclosed into 
private property in order to increase agricultural productivity.56  It also disputes the paper’s 
claims, examined more fully in the next two chapters, that non-capitalist farmers were slow to 
change and lacked a desire to innovate. 
Arthur Young, once one of the most influential supporters of enclosure, later 
recognized how enclosures had made conditions worse for labourers and remarked that he 
“had rather that all the commons of England were sunk in the sea, than that the poor should in 
future be treated on enclosing as they have been hitherto.”57  Though Young would come to 
question his belief in enclosing, The Economist was a steadfast advocate for enclosure and, 
hence, for a policy that increased pauperism and inequality.   
For The Economist, reclaiming common land and deforesting waste land for 
cultivation not only led to productivity, but contributed to a sense of order.  It pointed out the 
enormous aggregate of waste land represented by hedgerows, fences, and timber trees and 
argued that three-fourths to three-fifths of the hedgerows and fences “might be grubbed out 
advantageously for the country.”58  Near the hedgerows the crop was always less productive 
and a great loss of time and power were sustained in working the land from the frequent 
turnings necessary in small fields.59  Although few people would like to see the country 
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denuded of trees, the paper admitted, “it could not be denied that in many parts of the country 
the timber was in excess, and was highly detrimental to the crops.”60  It commended the 
members of a farmer’s club who wished to grow timber on plantations and to keep hedgerows 
to a minimum.  As the members reasoned, there did not have to be any loss of beauty to the 
landscape by the removal of all the trees from the midst of arable land.61  Clearing up the 
borders and corners of their field, keeping their yards and homesteads neat and orderly, and so 
forth, was not a lost and unproductive expenditure for farmers, the paper argued.  Such 
tidiness was “at once a consequence and a cause of order, and order in a business so 
multifarious as farming [was] one of the most certain sources of profit.”62   
The Economist claimed the clearing of forests and reclaiming of wastes symbolized 
the triumph of energy over lethargy.  It argued clearing and tilling the land improved it and 
brought beauty and order to the landscape, as well as economic gain.  At the same time, The 
Economist completely ignored Britain’s environmental degradation.  Britain’s use of wood for 
cooking, heating, shipbuilding, and other industries had led to its dramatic deforestation; by 
the 1600s Britain was far too deforested to meet its own needs.63  Deforestation had 
detrimental effects: fuel and timber shortages were a major problem in parts of Britain as 
forest land gave way to agricultural land.  Moreover, as the demand for wool grew, forests 
were cleared in favour of sheep, resulting in diminished forest cover and land degradation.64  
Due to soil erosion and silt deposits at the mouths of rivers, malaria affected between 47 to 71 
per cent of the local population in wetland regions throughout Europe.65  Some speculate 
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deforestation had begun to have deleterious effects on climate.  Climatic variability, in turn, 
led to harvest shortfalls.  Along with epidemic diseases, and a rise in fuel and food prices and 
unemployment rates, the 18th century appears to have been a period of falling living standards, 
hunger, and food riots.66    
Britain’s main quandary was that the production of food, fuel, fiber, and building 
supplies all competed for increasingly scarce land.  Constraints linked to energy, and 
ultimately to quantities of land, were one of the most important impediments to Britain’s 
further economic growth.  In order to relieve the constraint of a finite amount of land, Britain 
turned to coal for fuel, and to the Americas, which supplied Britain with resources and was 
the destination for many European migrants.  Reliance on the Americas and other colonies 
freed millions of acres of land in Britain for agriculture.  Britain was also able to transfer rural 
labour into manufacturing, in part, because the exploitation of its colonies made it 
unnecessary to mobilize the huge numbers of workers that would have been needed to use 
Britain’s own land in much more intensive and ecologically sustainable ways.  Instead, it 
acquired many of the supplies it needed by having others grow them, while putting its own 
labour into additional soldiers, traders, and producers of manufactured goods.67   
Environmental historian Richard Grove claimed the casual attitude taken by the 
British toward their own country’s deforestation could be explained by the fact that resource 
demands had been displaced to its colonies.  As a result, there were few incentives to take a 
long-term view of natural resources and no approach to the problem of resource depletion in 
Britain until the late 18th century, even when attitudes in other parts of Europe had already 
undergone a radical alteration.68  The Economist in the 19th century, after the British had 
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belatedly become aware of the consequences of deforestation, argued for a wholesale assault 
on the British environment.   
Though much of Europe had suffered from debilitating scarcities since the 14th century 
and “mortality spikes” in the 18th century, by the mid-19th century famine had disappeared 
from Western Europe.69  Famines increased devastatingly, however, throughout the rest of the 
world, due in part to deforestation for the production of export crops.  Deforestation in India, 
Ireland, and the Caribbean occurred primarily because of British demand for agricultural 
products – mostly wheat, cotton, indigo and tea in India; wheat, flax, cattle, and wool in 
Ireland, and sugar in the Caribbean islands.  As forests were cut down, erosion and flooding 
resulted, adding to falling agricultural yields and inducing famine.70  Marx was one of the first 
to argue that British industrialization depended on resources from elsewhere and that the 
“plundering of the Americas, India and Africa” were “chief moments of primitive 
accumulation.”71  Britain’s need for imports was combined with an economic policy that 
included a doctrinaire faith in market rationality, even if people were starving.  As its national 
wealth came to depend more and more on the sale of manufactured goods and the acquisition 
of raw materials from abroad, the desire to gain access to large markets without paying high 
tariffs became a key aspect of government policy.  British statesmen intended to open up 
world trade and believed it right to do so by force if necessary.72   
The Economist thus fervently advocated for measures that furthered the process of 
primitive accumulation.  Its support for enclosures and deforestation of waste land revealed 
that even while it claimed to be a proponent of laissez faire, instead of relying on the market 
to determine the fate of commoners, it depended on government intervention to restrict 
commoners’ ability to provide for their own needs and on government policies to secure 
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overseas resources.  Though the paper claimed that by these measures productivity would 
increase and benefit all, its argument was illusory; increased inequality, violent colonial 
ventures, and induced scarcity were the corollaries of improvement.   
 ‘Breaking up the hard clods of ignorance, prejudice, sloth and indifference’ 
In addition to enclosures and deforestation, The Economist believed scientific 
experiment would improve the countryside by breaking up long-held traditions, by producing 
uniformity, and increasing profits.  Not only farmers, but the whole country, it claimed, would 
benefit by the changes science brought to agriculture.  It threw its support behind the 
institutions and organizations that experimented with science and its application to 
agriculture.  It gave regular notice of lectures on scientific agriculture and supported the 
establishment of scientific agricultural colleges.73  In its Literature section, The Economist 
often referred farmers to scientific improvement books and practical references.74  It also 
frequently printed articles from the Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society.  The Society’s 
goal was to “promote improvement, and to spread throughout the country rural knowledge, 
which was often local and exclusive.”75  The Economist felt the Society produced much 
benefit to agriculture through its means of communicating to thousands of farmers what had 
been accomplished or attempted by other farmers, and by instructing farmers on the latest 
benefits of science.  The Journal formed a record of the progress of English husbandry, gave 
purpose and direction to agricultural experiment, and made valuable contributions to rural 
statistics.76  It was within the Journal and other scientific literature, the paper argued, that one 
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could discern how “the active and intelligent landlords, joined with the higher class of 
occupying farmers” were at work, 
breaking up the hard clods of ignorance, prejudice, sloth and indifference, which ha[d] 
pressed so heavily on all attempts to improve: and in their hands . . . the art of 
husbandry [was] rapidly changing into the science of agriculture.77   
 
For The Economist, science was the engine of improvement.  It was through science 
that knowledge would be increased and nature would be at man’s command.  The paper 
strongly encouraged farmers to keep accurate accounts of their cultivation and all the varying 
circumstances of soil, season, and so forth, under which their crops had been grown.  
Experiments in the field and the laboratory needed to go hand in hand, it argued, as the 
science of agriculture was currently “retarded by the want of more sure means of interrogating 
Nature in the field as well as in the laboratory.”78  The Economist believed that the ultimate 
aim of applied science, in its relation to agriculture, would be more fully and speedily attained 
as it succeeded in converting the practical farmer into “a skilful, reasoning, and cautious 
experimenter, and every agricultural holding into a progressing and profit-giving 
experimental farm.”79     
Removing ‘feudal trammels, settlements, and incumbrances’ 
The Economist also argued a less encumbered system of property in land and an active 
land market were necessary improvements.  The paper fervently campaigned for “free trade in 
land,” which implied that there should be no obstacles to the fullest and most beneficial 
possession of land and the enjoyment of its fruits.  The object of free trade in land was to 
bring more of “that inert mass of unimproved land” which still existed in Britain, into the 
market that it might pass into the hands of persons who had both the capital and energy to 
improve it and render it useful to society.  Free trade in land indicated “the sort of reformation 
in landowning the welfare of the community require[d]” and, the paper argued, could only be 
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accomplished by unfettering settled property – by disentangling it from the trammels which 
limited its productive powers.80   
Currently, The Economist noted, the system of property in land was barbarous, out of 
date, and far too complicated.  The ownership of land was so beset with “feudal trammels,” so 
“hampered by settlements, and often so borne down by incumbrances” that land could not be 
obtained upon terms which induced men of capital and enterprise to embark in its 
improvement and cultivation.81  Indeed, in the 19th century about 50 percent of all land in 
England was covered by family settlements which made it difficult to sell.82  These 
hindrances arose, argued The Economist, from the old, backward notion that land differed 
from other sorts of property – that it was more sacred and therefore should be dealt with on 
different principles.  That the most coveted land in England should remain hampered by a 
system originating in feudalism, was a reproach to national intelligence, the paper declared.  
The personal feelings of a man who was reluctant to let go of his hold upon any portion of the 
soil which he had once called his own had to give way to the national necessity.  “The 
community has the right to say to every one,” The Economist claimed, “either use your 
property profitably yourself or let others use it for you.”  Science could do nothing to improve 
the land if it was not free, if it was so “locked up by covenants and complexities and restricted 
by uses.”83  Property had to be loosed for the market and made capable of being owned quite 
independently of any grid of custom or of mutuality.84   
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In arguing that scientific experiment and a reformed system of property in land were 
‘national necessities’, The Economist justified policies that furthered primitive accumulation.  
As the rural poor lacked the capital to buy scientific journals or undertake experiments and 
relied on family settlements for entitlement to land, scientific experiment and a change in 
property laws were meant to dispossess them of land.  Though the paper argued science and 
new property laws improved the welfare of the whole community, they, in fact, increased the 
insecurity and poverty of a large portion of the community. 
Overall, The Economist’s vision of rural change was evidence of its faith in the 
domination of nature and the use of scientific knowledge to expand production.  The changes 
in the countryside The Economist promoted cleared the land of age-old traditions, removed 
obstacles to capital, and were part and parcel of a move to a change in the mode of 
production.  In addition to these changes, the paper was obsessed with the collection of 
agricultural statistics in rural England.  Statistics would play a crucial rule in removing the 
barriers to capitalism that still remained and would assist in bringing about a new rational 
order in the countryside.   
Statistics: ‘The Science of the State’ 
From the middle ages, European states had begun to map out their territories.  As the 
modern state became increasingly concerned with the productivity and well-being of its 
population, these efforts were accompanied by attempts to enumerate, categorize, and assess 
its population.  Thus much of early modern European statecraft was devoted to rationalizing, 
simplifying, and standardizing what was a “social hieroglyph” of its subjects’ landholdings 
and complex tenure arrangements, their wealth, location, and identity.  In order to mark out 
the extent of their resources and to utilize them in a coherent way, states needed the legibility 
of maps and cadastral surveys.  Censuses arranged the population in ways that simplified the 
46 
state functions of taxation and conscription.  The fear of activism and crime also enhanced the 
state’s desire to count people and resources.85   
As surveys and censuses became more precise and widespread in the 19th century, they 
acquired an important role in Britain and its growing culture of quantification.  The early 
Economist contributed to the preoccupation with statistics and sought to be the leading 
statistical journal of its day.  During his time as editor, Wilson used all the useful figures he 
could find, determined that his readers should understand that there was probably “no science 
of greater importance to all other sciences than Statistics.  In every way connected with the 
condition of the people – moral, physical, social or material – this science has proved of the 
deepest importance.”  Wilson argued statistics would do more “to wipe away the cobwebs 
which narrowed prejudices, unworthy jealousies, unchristian animosities and inflamed 
passion had contrived” than any other reasoning or argument.86   
If science was the engine of improvement, facts and numbers were its handmaiden.  
Statistics were a critical part of rational knowledge, of stating and arranging ‘facts’.  They 
were seemingly innocent and implied to be impartial or value-free because they appeared to 
erase interest and politics.87  However, statistics were practical tools for the modern state – 
they were a guide to policy and legislation.  Indeed, statistics were “the science of the state.”88  
At the root of the idea of statistics lay the notion that one could improve or control a 
population by enumeration and classification.  Through statistics the idea of a norm became 
codified; statistics discerned order and regularities, or irregularities, in nature as well as in 
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people’s habits.89  They made nature and its resources calculable and society more legible, 
and hence manipulable.  The state’s knowledge of itself gave it strength and the legibility and 
visibility produced out of this knowledge provided the capacity for large-scale 
improvements.90   
The Economist argued statistical detail of the cultivation of England would do much to 
aid the desire for improvement and be of great national utility.91  After several successful 
experiments in collecting statistics in Ireland and Scotland, Poor Law inspectors were 
instructed to collect voluntary reports from their respective districts in England.  The paper 
frequently commented on this largely failed endeavour from the late 1840s until the early 
1860s.  It complained about farmers’ reluctance and apprehension over the collection of 
agricultural statistics, noting that agriculturalists believed the scheme was inquisitorial.  They 
saw it as too close a scrutiny into their affairs, as something by which they could be more 
heavily taxed or see their rents increase.92  Some made it appear as if the livestock and land 
they cultivated were much less than they really were, others refused to complete the statistical 
returns and many, even “gentlemen of station and influence,” were hostile to the whole 
scheme.93   
On the other end, the Poor Law inspectors were unhappy with the ill-feeling that was 
directed towards them because of their new role as enumerators.  They did not recommend 
any extension or repetition of the experiment due to the difficulty they had in obtaining the 
returns and added that if statistical information was to be collected, there needed to be an 
enactment rendering the returns compulsory by an act of Parliament.  The Economist agreed 
that returns should be made compulsory, that the community be taxed to pay for collecting 
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them, and that the Poor Law inspectors be left to their proper duties.  The paper believed the 
Board of Trade would be much more likely to secure success, and as there was to be a police 
in every county, it was not improbable that, as in Ireland, it might be found to be the best 
machinery to collect agricultural statistics.94  Thus The Economist went from saying that 
statistics were important, even necessary, to proposing that in the face of opposition to their 
collection, the oppressive and surveillance powers of the state be heightened and non-
submission be made a crime. 
As to the resistance of agriculturalists, The Economist pointed to the history of the 
agricultural statistics question in England.  Agricultural statistics were started, or at least 
chiefly advocated, during the anti-Corn Law agitation by some of the most earnest supporters 
of free trade.  The free traders alleged that the statistics of agriculture properly collected and 
recorded, apart from their scientific value and general usefulness, would greatly elucidate 
matters of fact in relation to English agriculture.  Of course, The Economist complained, all 
the weight of the landed interest was thrown into the scale against agricultural statistics.  All 
sorts of suspicions were intimated as to the uses to which such information might be turned.  
Opposition to the collection of agricultural statistics succeeded, but after the Corn Laws were 
repealed, the landlords no longer expressed any vehement objections to their collection; the 
opposition now came from farmers.  The paper also acknowledged that the numbering of 
people was always evaded as much as possible because it was suspected to be the forerunner 
of new taxes.  As a result, the farmer now associated every attempt to obtain information with 
an increase of his rent.  However, this fear, The Economist believed, was the result of the ill-
defined relationship between farmers and landlords.  It was not the Board of Trade, or the 
Poor Law Board, or any “twaddle” about centralization the farmers were afraid of, but simply 
a fear of raised rents.  The apprehensions farmers had about their landlords ought to lead them 
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to adopt other measures of precaution, not to impede the collection of agricultural statistics, 
the paper argued.  In future collections The Economist felt regard should be given to the 
prejudices of the farmers by making the inquiries as little offensive as possible.95   
While The Economist noted that farmers feared increased taxation, in all it believed 
their fear was unfounded and mostly ignorant.  It argued the real reason many farmers in 
England did not wish to disclose such statistics was because of the consciousness that their 
capitals were not sufficient for the proper management of their farms.  The paper maintained 
the capital employed in cultivation of the land was underrated, and socially and politically the 
farming classes lost much of their influence from their true wealth being unknown.  The truth 
was, it claimed, the farming classes had not yet recognized the plain fact that agriculture was 
as much a trade as any branch of manufacture, and that whatever threw light upon the relation 
of supply and demand, or gave them early and general information respecting their concerns, 
was of great value.  Instead, farmers adhered to old traditional instincts and suspicions that 
induced them to “go on groping in the dark rather than to possess knowledge.”  Farmers, in 
ignorance of facts, could not act with safety, The Economist claimed.  Their transactions 
assumed the character of gambling on chances rather than the well-considered speculations or 
certainty statistics would allow.  None of the various adventures and speculations in which 
enterprising British traders and capitalists engaged was undertaken without accurate 
information, the paper noted.96   
While no greater advantage could be afforded to the agricultural classes than a system 
which would enable them to regulate the value of their crops from year to year, The 
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Economist felt statistics were also a matter of public importance.97  It claimed they were 
necessary for securing a production more exactly adapted to the public’s wants and to 
obtaining a more perfect equilibrium of supply and demand and greater equalities of price.  
Like 19th century high modernists who claimed the scientific domination of nature was 
emancipatory, providing freedom from scarcity and liberation from the irrationalities of 
superstition, The Economist, ironically, given the demands for their collection to be 
compulsory, also framed its justification for the collection of agricultural statistics in terms of 
freedom.98  With accurate statistics agriculturalists could escape from ignorance into 
information.  Statistics were essential for feeding the country, ensuring against scarcity and, in 
fact, necessary for a proper functioning of the market, it maintained.99   
The Economist praised the collection of statistics in Ireland for reducing the 
uncertainty of its food supply: 
At this moment the greatest uncertainty exists as to the amount of food which the 
present crops of Great Britain will afford. . . . In Ireland there is far less doubt; for 
Lord Clarendon, availing himself of the well-organized constabulary force in that 
kingdom, has obtained returns of agricultural produce, which give a tolerably accurate 
notion of the amount of food grown in Ireland.100 
  
The paper’s praise for the collection of statistics in Ireland was rather ironic.  Statistics were 
better kept primarily because it was a colony, subject to the heavy-handed police controls 
inherent in the colonial situation.  The Economist, also ironically, commended Ireland’s 
statistics because they revealed the collapse of the Irish small-scale farmer, which had been a 
consequence of the potato famine and the intended result of the nature of British government 
relief provided for the famine.101  As the paper pointed out, Ireland’s statistical report of 1847 
revealed that a very important change had been effected in that country since the census of 
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1841.  The report showed the pleasing fact that small farms had diminished in number while 
large farms had increased by a greater ratio, leading to the general conclusion that a very large 
increase in the entire quantity of cultivated land had taken place.  The Economist was 
impressed with the great clearness and precision with which the statistical returns were 
prepared and expressed hope that so useful an example as had been set by the Irish 
government would soon be followed in England.102    
Statistics had a long history in Ireland.  The Economist used them extensively to 
justify non-intervention, starvation, and emigration during the Irish famine and its aftermath.  
Statistics provided “proof of the correctness of our views” on Ireland, the paper remarked.103  
Earlier, Oliver Cromwell’s massive exercise in colonization, designed to transform the whole 
of Irish society, required statistics.  William Petty, the physician-general of Cromwell’s army, 
became Cromwell’s ‘Surveyor General’ and gave Ireland “the doubtful distinction of being 
the most accurately surveyed and mapped country in Europe.”104  Petty set out in 1679 to map 
not only the land, but to value it for the purpose of distributing it to Cromwell’s soldiers.  He 
also profited from his role as surveyor, picking up 13,000 pounds sterling and 18,000 acres of 
land for himself.  Petty did not stop at measuring the value of the land, however.  His survey 
gave him the opportunity to examine the social and economic conditions of an entire people.  
With this information he calculated the comparative value of human beings in ‘improved’ and 
‘unimproved’ societies.  He computed the economic benefit the crown received from Ireland’s 
citizens and suggested that the loss of an Irish life cost the crown less than that of an English 
life.  Petty estimated that the improvement of Ireland, under an imperial power whose 
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objective was to transform the Irish, could raise the value of an Irishman to that of an 
Englishman.  With Petty’s theory of value came the new ‘science’ of political economy, and 
for the English, a demonstration of the ‘usefulness’ statistics could have.105  If, in the eyes of 
The Economist, agricultural statistics were to transform English agriculture to more closely 
approximate Ireland’s situation, it was no wonder many people in the English countryside 
opposed their collection.    
The Economist argued agricultural statistics would be valuable for showing the 
improvements which had increased the productiveness of England’s agriculture.  Even more 
importantly, the paper felt statistics would be most valuable for revealing which farms needed 
improvement – which farms were deficient of capital and which soils or crops could be 
improved.106  Agricultural statistics of the character of the soil of each piece of land, its state 
of culture, and whether it was improving or stationary, in juxtaposition with the actual amount 
of the growing crops, would show many of the causes of abundance or deficiency in each 
district.107  As the paper explained: 
The collection and publication of all these statistical facts would have an immediate 
effect on the improvement of land in general.  It would be seen that in one district, or 
in one parish, or on one farm, that the proportion of green crops to grain crops is much 
greater than in another district . . . that the quantities of stock kept on a given area vary 
not with the quality of land, but with the system of culture. . . . So we should find that 
all these differences may be traced to some circumstances which are quite within the 
control of the persons interested in the land either as owners or occupiers . . .108 
 
In other words, accurate statistics would make plain some of the obstacles to improvement.109  
The fear English farmers felt was common; people were wary of statistics.  As the 
state became more intrusive through the rise of government officials and police to act as 
agents of surveillance, its need to govern through legibility and visibility came into conflict 
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with individuals’ need for freedom and autonomy.  The Economist was advocating for more 
government intrusion and surveillance in a manner that was opposed by most of the people it 
would affect.  This was clearly not the beneficial workings of the market but rather the heavy 
hand of the state being used to foster conditions for investment and capital against the wishes 
of the majority of the rural population. 
A bill was introduced that proposed making agricultural statistics compulsory, but it 
was rejected in the House of Commons in 1858.  The Economist ridiculed those who rejected 
the bill, while it was hopeful that as agriculturalists became more self-reliant and enterprising 
the difficulties in collecting statistics would gradually vanish.  It argued that in the present, 
trust should be given to private enterprise for statistical information about agriculture.  But, by 
1862 the paper was discouraged and felt any scheme for collecting statistics in rural England 
was nearly impossible.  The government was unwilling to embark on a large expenditure for 
the purpose, the agricultural population was still apprehensive about the collection of 
statistical facts, and any attempts to collect them through the police or the Poor Law officers 
were generally deemed by local authorities to be inexpedient.110  It was not until 1866 that the 
Agricultural Returns of Great Britain for the first time supplied an accurate account of the 
acreage, cropping, and livestock of the country.111 
The capacity of rural society to subvert and thwart the collection of statistics for some 
time was clearly revealed in The Economist’s articles.  State action was met with a resistant 
rural society in England that could make its influence felt.  Because a key element for the 
success of high modernist schemes was a weakened or collapsed civil society that lacked the 
capacity to resist these plans, agricultural statistics were gathered first and most effectively in 
colonial regimes.  Colonies were often ‘laboratories of improvement’ – places of extensive 
experiment in social restructuring and testing grounds for the effects of transforming property 
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relations.  Censuses and surveys were gathered first in colonial regimes partly because 
colonial governments could not understand these societies and sought to make them legible, 
in part because colonial governments believed that they needed to tamper with tradition more 
fully in these societies, and partly because colonial societies were less able to oppose such 
schemes under the full force of a colonial power.112   
In all, statistical enumeration attempted to connect the state and the population, to 
make the countryside and its inhabitants visible, legible, and available to economic 
calculation.  Statistics were especially useful to the state in determining where barriers to 
capitalism still existed.  Statistical information contributed to the making of a national 
economy and played a central role in the politics based upon a knowledge of population and 
territory that Foucault characterized as governmentality – the characteristic power of the 
modern state in which government acted on the conduct of a population so as to shape, guide, 
and correct their actions.  As productivity and wealth creation became increased concerns of 
the state, it would seek to construct citizens that reflected these concerns.113   
The Economist’s desire to bring agriculture under the statistical gaze represented an 
effort to demonstrate which farms were not yet productive or ‘progressive and profit-giving’.  
This knowledge would justify the dispossession of small-scale farmers who lacked capital.  
Indeed, in its drive to collect agricultural statistics, The Economist was concerned with 
furthering primitive accumulation, even though the logic of primitive accumulation was in 
direct conflict with its purported adherence to the values of laissez faire.  Statistics required 
police methods and were intended to dispossess and dislocate the rural poor.  Yet the paper 
claimed the whole country would benefit from the freedom from scarcity and want statistics 
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would provide.  In fact, it argued, statistical information would allow for a proper functioning 
of the market and farmers themselves could not be safe without them.   
In this regard, The Economist’s arguments were most contradictory.  Indeed, its whole 
ethic of improvement was an ethic of exploitation, dependent on land dispossession and 
environmental destruction, both in Britain and abroad.  While the 19th century is commonly 
thought of as the age of laissez faire, when the state only intermittently and reluctantly 
intervened in the economy, this chapter demonstrates that governments acted to promote 
industrial growth and to clear away barriers to capitalism.  As it was the rural poor that 
especially had to be subjugated to the needs of capitalism, The Economist advocated a new 
mode of agricultural production and a wholesale transformation of agrarian relations that 
would further the process of primitive accumulation.  It is to the paper’s vision of a capitalist 
mode of agricultural production that this thesis now turns. 
56 
CHAPTER TWO - Developing a Capitalist Mode of Agricultural Production 
 Agricultural production was a core area in which changes were needed in order to 
cement capitalist relations of production.  The main reason given by improvers and political 
economists for a change in production was that Britain’s progress required it; the whole 
country would benefit by it, they claimed.  To improve agriculture was to turn it into a 
commodity-producing enterprise directed toward the creation of surpluses and profits.  This 
capitalist mode of agriculture measured the value of land only in terms of its productivity and 
profit; any other use it might have was deemed sentimental, antiquated, unproductive, and an 
obstacle to national improvement.1   
The Economist was concerned with improving and increasing agricultural production, 
but only in certain ways.  It fervently campaigned for free trade in agriculture and then 
championed the development of ‘high farming’ – a modern production and profit-driven 
system of agriculture.  High farming, to the paper, required large applications of fertilizer, 
mechanization, substantial labour and capital investment, free trade, and enlarged 
landholdings.  Central to this vision of agricultural change was the dispossession of the rural 
poor – the smallholders who lacked the means to farm ‘highly’.  Indeed, the high agriculture 
the paper promoted was intended to limit access to land, reserving it for modern, profit-
maximizing farmers.   
The Economist claimed high agriculture was brought about by the organizing miracles 
of the market and benefited the whole country by dramatically increasing production.  This 
chapter disputes those claims, arguing that a capitalist mode of production was productive 
only in a liberal economic sense and required government interventions to develop and 
sustain it.  The Economist’s contradictions were illuminated most clearly, this chapter 
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contends, in its hostility toward any measure that would alleviate rural poverty, even while it 
claimed that its vision of agricultural change would benefit all.   
The Move to a Free Trade in Agriculture 
In order to attract capital, energy, and intellectual power to the soil, the paper argued 
agriculture needed to be freed from anything that stood in the way of capital being fully and 
securely employed.2  This included the principle of protectionism.  The early Economist was 
intent on seeing the Corn Laws repealed so a free trade in agriculture could be put in place.  
Established in 1815, the Corn Laws were parliamentary measures that aided British 
landowners who produced grain by taxing foreign grain imports.  The legislation derived from 
the days of the Napoleonic wars when Britain feared being unable to feed its own population 
and wished to boost local production.  To the free-traders the laws seemed an anachronism.3   
The Corn Laws, however, had contributed to the process of primitive accumulation.  
The laws encouraged large-scale grain production and reduced the viability of small-scale 
farming as the tariff on grain shifted production toward grain and away from the dairy 
products, vegetables, and other crops small-scale producers grew.  Price supports helped 
larger farmers who marketed the majority of their grain, and only farmers with large amounts 
of capital could undertake the capital-intensive project of draining wetlands.  Moreover, large 
grain farms required less labour than small-scale farming; grain farming required only 
seasonal labour, while smallholders usually adopted a system that included several different 
crops in order to spread labour over a longer period of time.  The Corn Laws, therefore, 
contributed to the amount of labour working for wages.   
It was only after the laws had served their purpose in manipulating the domestic 
labour market and in furthering primitive accumulation that the free-traders abandoned them 
in the name of freedom of the market.  Yet most of the political economists, and The 
                                               
2
 “Agricultural Meetings – Go on, or Come on?”, The Economist, October 17, 1863, pp. 1154-1155. 
3
 Bayly, p. 136. 
58 
Economist, presented themselves as firm opponents of the Corn Laws.  Accordingly, they 
would seem to be blameless for the hardships created by these laws.  The paper’s silence on 
the differential impact of the Corn Laws may be seen as the start of its opposition to the 
small-scale producer and to a practice of obscuring the nature of its mission.4   
The Economist argued against the Corn Laws, and any agricultural protection, by 
claiming free trade would benefit everyone.  Protection added nothing to the national wealth 
and, in fact, it claimed, any attempt to promote special interests injured the whole community.  
It was “short-sighted” and “absolutely criminal” with an “excess” rural population, to 
maintain a system of laws that prevented men from “providing themselves with food through 
the instrumentality of the best and only resources which England had left” – employment in 
manufactures.  In fact, it argued, to maintain England’s protectionist laws would be “as wise 
and as just if another Ireland were to spring up by our side, and we were to prohibit its 
cultivation.”5  But by extending England’s manufactures and increasing manufacturers’ 
profits, by opening to them unrestricted exchanges with all the world, a far larger, better, 
more permanent, and more profitable home market would be secured to farmers, the paper 
maintained.  Labour, unrestricted by legislation, would also find its way into the most natural 
channels and the aggregate wealth of the whole nation would advance.6   
England found that once manufacturing had taken hold, cheap food was needed for its 
industrial classes.  After the Corn Laws were repealed in 1846, a free trade in agriculture 
allowed England to service its growing and rapidly industrializing population with foodstuffs 
from around the world and allowed The Economist to advocate for a high farming dependent 
on free trade.   
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The Economist’s High Agriculture  
Colin Duncan in The Centrality of Agriculture, argued that high farming, as it was 
commonly known in the Victorian era, centered on a four-course crop rotation that used 
sheep, in effect, as mobile fertilizer factories.  He claimed this closed system was more 
productive, ecologically benign, and labour intensive than other systems.7  Others claimed, 
too, that the age of high farming was a golden age in the history of Britain.  There was an 
unquestioning spirit of confidence in the ethos, methods and products of high farming, argued 
historian Trevor Wild.  Landowners and farmers maintained a complete faith in mixed 
farming, the profitability of which seemed to be eternal.8  Lord Ernle, in 1912, reasoned high 
farming advanced because the old system had failed.  Open-field farmers and commoners, he 
argued, could never have fed a manufacturing population or adopted agricultural 
improvements which required significant expenditures.  For Lord Ernle, the most conspicuous 
difference between the earlier type of agriculturalist and the modern type of farmer was the 
latter’s readiness to invest capital in the land.  He admitted the disappearance of small-scale 
farmers and commoners was a social loss, but it was requisite that farming should be 
transformed from a self-sufficing domestic industry into a profit-earning manufactory.  The 
1850s and 60s, he claimed, were a period marked by advancing prosperity, rising rents and 
profits, a rapid multiplication of fertilizing agencies, an expanding area of grain cultivation, 
more livestock, and improvements in machinery.9  Similarly, The Economist was convinced 
that it was by “high cultivation only that the English farmer [could] succeed.”  It claimed that 
through high farming, England would see a prodigious increase in the produce of the soil.10   
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Evidently there was much faith in a system of high farming.  Agricultural policy 
around the world has for centuries called on a scientific or high farming approach to solving 
the world’s food problems, based on the belief that this system created dramatic increases in 
production.11  While there could be substantial benefits from the closed system of high 
farming Duncan described, other accounts like Lord Ernle’s call into question the claim that 
high farming was closed, labour intensive, or that it was sustainable and more productive in 
the sense Duncan maintained it was.  Historian F. M. L. Thompson argued the push to 
increase yields led to the addition of external inputs.  English food production became 
increasingly dependent on the mining of soils elsewhere and liberal economic ideology held 
that capital seeking profit should be allowed to pursue its immediate best interests without 
hindrance.12  The Economist also revealed that it was not content with a closed system of high 
farming.   
For The Economist, the foundation of high agriculture was livestock farming.13  It 
continuously encouraged increased meat production and consumption within Britain as it felt 
the great mass of people still did not eat enough meat “to the extent that would be desirable 
for health and comfort.”  It claimed that as people became more prosperous through the 
opening up of commercial and manufacturing outlets they would become greater consumers 
and consume better kinds of food.  High farming would allow people to eat well, but it also 
meant feeding animals well and “making the land to suit the beasts, rather than starving the 
beasts to suit the land.”14  The Economist, therefore, advocated breaking up second-rate 
pastures to convert inferior grazing farms to ones of mixed husbandry and urged for improved 
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Irish husbandry in order to satisfy Britain’s great want for more meat.15  It recommended 
farmers should do all they could to increase their production of both grain and cattle.16   
The Economist’s articles testified to a shift from grain production to more meat 
production – a common feature of an agriculture attuned to the better off consumer who could 
afford to increase the meat in their diet.  In most instances, this shift had a detrimental impact 
on the land and its ability to produce enough food, and on the diet of the poor.  To alleviate 
the constraints of environmental degradation and limited amounts of land, The Economist 
promoted foreign imports of grain.  It was encouraged that farmers were “wisely availing 
themselves of cheap foreign grain for feeding,” and in a quote from the Mark Lane Express 
noted that many beasts were fattening and  
luxuriating in rich mixtures of turnips, hay, and corn brought from various parts of the 
globe.  It is no unusual thing now to see an ox chewing his cud over a meal of maize 
from America, beans from Russia, linseed from the plains of Germany, and lentils 
from the banks of the fertile rivers of Egypt.  To such a pitch has agricultural 
commerce come.17 
 
But not only were the British importing grain for livestock, by this point 14 percent of 
British calories were coming from sugar, while the per capita consumption of bread, 
vegetables, and dairy products stagnated.  Sugar, tobacco, coffee, and tea, all grown outside 
Europe, fuelled Britain’s industrial labour force.  The diet of the industrial worker became 
heavily dependent on these stimulants because it was so bereft of nutrition.  Stimulants 
provided much needed bursts of energy during the long workdays and because they were easy 
to prepare and could be consumed quickly, they were well-suited to the routines of 
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increasingly disciplined work.18  Britain also relied on other foodstuffs and supplies grown 
beyond its borders to relieve the strain of what was truly scarce in Britain – land.  The 
transatlantic slave trade, sugar plantation system, the East India Company, and peasants 
around the world who were forced to grow food for export, played a crucial part in enabling 
Britain to exchange manufactured goods for land-intensive food and fiber at reasonable, and 
even falling, prices.19  The Economist thus supported and promoted an agricultural system that 
catered to the rich, was based on an unquestioned faith in the benefits of trade, and depended 
on the state power and coercion that were necessary components of this trade system.  It 
advocated a system of agriculture that placed risks on Britain’s own food supply, while 
exporting considerable ecological cost, expropriation, and famine around the world.20    
Britain also relied on imports of fertilizer to improve its depleted soils.  Historian 
Kenneth Pomeranz argued English agricultural productivity between 1750 and 1850 remained 
flat and the threat of decline was constant until Britain began mining, importing, and later 
synthesizing fertilizer.  Imports of guano – nitrate-heavy sea bird droppings found mainly on 
the Peruvian coast – became a key characteristic of high farming in the mid-19th century.  
They did so, in part, because profit-seeking farmers who had pressed the land to its limits did 
not want to increase their wage bills with labour-intensive methods of restoring the soil.  In a 
high farming system dependent on profits it, rather absurdly, became more advantageous to 
buy supplies from a remote source than to draw on traditional methods.21   
The Economist championed the use of guano and other fertilizers.  It claimed a “good 
farmer” brought guano onto his farm and argued that “good farming” did not consist in the 
adoption of a four-course, five-course, or any other rotation of crops, but “in the degree of 
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fertility the farmer [could] maintain.”22  As a “first-rate farmer” proclaimed in the paper, 
guano “was a godsend, a blessing conferred on farming.”23  With additional supplies of 
manure the paper felt “the growth of corn may be enlarged to an extent that for all practical 
purposes we may call unlimited.”24   
Imports of fertilizer grew each year: in 1841, The Economist noted, the quantity of 
fertilizer imported was only 2,881 tons, but by 1850 it had risen to no less than 116,925 tons.  
In 1846 a farmer commented that in many instances the farmer paid as much to the manure 
merchant as he did to his landlord.  The paper added that sometimes a farmer paid 7 or 8 
pound sterling an acre for rent and 20 pound sterling an acre for artificial manure.25  While 
many might see this as an indication of the decline of agriculture and the inability of the land 
to produce crops without costly, artificial assistance, The Economist argued that increased 
importations of guano were evidence of the improved character of agriculture and a measure 
of the progress of British agriculture.  It claimed the source of improvements in the last 20 
years could be traced mainly to the Royal Agricultural Society and to the importation of 
guano.26   
In hopes for easier access to more guano, The Economist printed and supported 
appeals made by agriculturalists to the British government asking for assistance in obtaining 
some relaxation of the Peruvian government’s monopoly of guano.27  Then in the 1850s, 
when few new deposits of guano were being found, the paper, rather ironically, repeatedly 
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warned that farmers would do well to remember that guano could not last much longer.28  As 
anxiety spread over indications that supplies of guano were low, it printed appeals made by 
the Royal Agricultural Society for the discovery of a manure equal in fertilizing power to 
guano and which might be sold at a cheaper rate.29  Ultimately, the high farming system The 
Economist advocated was dependent on a finite fertilizer: Britain mined the accumulated 
nitrates of guano from Peru so extensively that what took thousands of years to create was 
gone in decades.30   
Along with increased fertilizer use, The Economist argued high farming required more 
mechanization.  It insisted that better tillage, not less tillage was needed as “the land ought to 
be forced to bear more, both of corn and stock provender, not to be allowed to go back to a 
state of nature.”31  This was rather contradictory as increased mechanization actually 
interfered with preserving soil fertility in many cases; it was in part because of mechanization 
that increasing amounts of fertilizers were needed just to keep yields from declining.32  But 
the paper claimed the system of deep draining and the practice of sub-soil ploughing were the 
new powers given to the husbandman, and necessarily added to the value of land.33  It praised 
the advances made in steam machinery and often reported on the latest implement shows and 
exhibitions, including the Great Exhibition of 1851.   
The Economist argued exhibitions were important in stimulating the improvement of 
machinery, as well as invigorating the agricultural mind.34  Timothy Mitchell, in Colonizing 
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Egypt, noted that exhibitions brought leading men in manufactures, commerce, and science 
into close communication with each other, promoted the profusion of material goods, and 
symbolized the accomplishment of economic transformations, such as new productive 
relationships to the land.  Exhibitions not only reflected Britain’s advancement, but were the 
means of its production through their technique of rendering history and progress in 
‘objective’ form.  Exhibitions, Mitchell explained, were designed to create an imagined 
reality to substitute for a more complicated one.  They fostered a veneer of modernity and by 
doing so helped modernity triumph.35    
According to The Economist, the use of machinery would further Britain’s progress 
and benefit all, including the rural poor, by inducing a larger employment of labour.  Thus the 
paper found it curious to find a gentleman, Mr. Acton, express “a hope that all these 
improvements would not have the effect of displacing manual labour.”  This gentleman could 
know little of practical husbandry, The Economist retorted, or he would have been aware that 
wherever steam machinery was used on a farm, there was always more labour and better paid 
labour than on farms where steam labour was not employed.  Improved implements afforded 
economy of time and money and wherever implements were used, they led to other 
improvements, which invariably required more labour, the paper reasoned.36   
But The Economist’s argument about labour was in direct contradiction to what it had 
said at other times about the relation between labour and mechanization.  Presumably there 
would be significant labour employed in initial improvements such as draining, however, the 
paper had also argued that improving agriculture meant to produce more food by less labour.  
In another instance it argued machines and instruments should be introduced which facilitated 
and condensed labour.  It claimed every mechanical invention set free labour that could then 
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“explore the resources of Britain’s distant possessions, extend the British name, and plant new 
markets for British industry.”37   
In reality, capitalist farmers were intent on labour-cost minimization and profit 
maximization.  Instead of employing more labour, large farms adopted methods which raised 
labour productivity.38  Likewise, The Economist was really most concerned with the 
productiveness of labour.  It argued that machinery would allow the farmer to secure the best 
and most steady labourers so that with them, assisted by machinery, he might rely less on 
occasional and immigrant labour.  The labour of the “loose” class of occasional labourers was 
commonly of the feeblest and least effective kind, The Economist claimed.  These were men 
of “dissolute and unsteady habits,” consuming with utter improvidence the large wages they 
earned during the summer months and relying on poor relief in the winter.  But with mowing, 
reaping and hay-making machines, farmers could discard the services of these “Irish reapers, 
militiamen, and other half-labourer, half-vagabond assistants.”  The paper maintained it was 
the hedgers, ditchers, drainers, ploughmen, and men who could manage steam machinery and 
superior implements, all people who had some degree of skill and regular employment, whose 
labour was respectable and valuable.39  Circumstances had “drawn forth the force which 
slumbered in the peasants’ arm; the result ha[d] been that, though the labourers [were] fewer, 
they ha[d] done more work than heretofore,” The Economist remarked.40  Overall, it argued 
machines would better the condition of rural labourers by disciplining them – by making them 
skilled and by driving them to seek and retain regular employment.  By employing less 
labour, mechanization would also drive those less skilled and less willing to adapt to the 
cities.  The paper claimed that nothing was more conducive to the well-being of agricultural 
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labourers than the fact that workmen of good character were being sought.41  Thus it was not 
that mechanized farms increased the need for labour, as The Economist argued when belittling 
Mr. Acton, rather they needed fewer, but better labourers.  Mechanization would both purge 
the countryside of improper labourers and improve those who remained.   
For The Economist, high farming meant a system in which land was used 
“advantageously,” regarded as property capable of being rendered more productive by all 
which came under the term improvement.42  In short, it claimed a modern farm using a system 
of high farming or “elaborate culture” was a somewhat complicated “rural manufactory of the 
raw materials of food.”43  As The Economist’s manufactory of grain and meat was dependent 
on foreign imports, used expensive machinery, required less labour, and “presupposed a 
considerable amount of capital,” it was clearly not more productive or economically efficient 
in any sense, except a liberal economic one.44   
Capital: ‘the deity of their idolatry’ 
The Economist was obsessed with applying capital to the land, as many early 19th 
century improvers were.  Preoccupied with capital, they sought to remove everything they 
believed stood in the way of it finding its equilibrium or ‘natural’ level.  There were a few 
detractors, however.  An English writer, under the pseudonym of Piercy Ravenstone, wrote of 
capital in 1821:  
It serves to account for whatever cannot be accounted for in any other way.  Where 
reason fails, where argument is insufficient, it operates like a talisman to silence all 
doubts.  It occupies the same place in their theories, which was held by darkness in the 
mythology of the ancients.  It is the root of all their genealogies, it is the great mother 
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of all things, it is the cause of every event that happens in the world.  Capital, 
according to them, is the parent of industry, the forerunner of all improvements.  It 
builds our towns, it cultivates our fields . . .  it bids fertility arise where all before was 
desolation.  It is the deity of their idolatry which they have set up to worship in the 
high places of the Lord; and were its powers what they imagine, it would not be 
unworthy of their adoration.45   
 
Ravenstone articulated well the strange paradox of capital: though itself an illusion and 
containing no power, though not real wealth, only a representation of wealth, its effects were 
everywhere felt.46   
For The Economist, capital had nearly magical properties; it was the elixir for every 
problem in agriculture.  The land was of far less value than it ought to be, and readily could 
be made by investments of capital, the paper declared.47  “No one now denies that the 
business of husbandry in England languishes for want of capital,” it added.  When The 
Economist inquired into why labourers were starving within sight of acres of land on which 
they might easily raise the value of their wages, its answer was that the connecting link of 
capital was wanting.  “Before you can improve the district by uniting labour and land in the 
work of production, you must attract to the cultivation of that land capital in some form or 
other,” the paper made clear, without for a moment considering that it was this obsession with 
capital that prevented labourers from working the land.48  Indeed, what prevented famished 
labourers from working the land and thus not starving, were restrictions such as The 
Economist was proposing, that saved land for capital and prevented the poor from working it.    
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The paper claimed high farming had more to do with capital than the natural quality 
and powers of the soil.  Not surprisingly, then, those who were most successful were the men 
who did not hesitate to sink their capital in the soil.49  These men were of the modern school 
and were enterprising, scientific, “go-ahead” farmers.50  High farming, the paper argued, 
required capital and more intelligent care than that which enabled men to merely subsist.  It 
bemoaned the fact that a large extent of land was in the occupation of tenants with little 
intelligence or capital, as a sure accompaniment of deficient capital was a want of enterprise.  
The Economist claimed these “low” or “routine” farmers were, compared with the active high 
farmers, like so many “agricultural Rip Van Winkles, who had slept for some 60 or 70 years, 
and who were willing to sleep on still.”  The paper believed that where a farmer “ha[d] really 
no capital, nor the energy and intelligence necessary to acquire it, he ought not to be allowed 
to continue to farm.”51   
Concerned about the districts where farmers were “content to plod on in a routine of 
husbandry little better than that pursued by their forefathers,” The Economist felt landowners 
could use their intelligence to instruct those without capital.  Since “bad farming was apt to 
become contagious,” it required both energy and discretion on the part of a landed proprietor 
to originate and carry out a general system of improvement.  Where there were well-cultivated 
farms, a thriving tenantry, and orderly and well-conditioned labourers, The Economist 
claimed there was proof that a landlord had stimulated improvement and encouraged his 
tenantry to apply more capital to the land.52   
In another article it claimed that the greatest benefit a landlord could confer upon his 
tenants would be to relieve them of some portion of their farms, leaving them the homesteads, 
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and from one-half to two-thirds the land.  They would then have a larger proportion of capital 
and would soon feel the benefits of high cultivation.  This was a ridiculous argument by The 
Economist; the claim that taking away most of a farmer’s land would benefit him because he 
would then have more capital was absurd and contradictory, as elsewhere the paper 
tenaciously opposed any division of farms into smaller holdings.  The Economist instructed 
that the land taken away should be formed into one or two more farms, and should be let to 
men who would set an example of superior cultivation.53  It went on to argue that if there 
were no existing capitalist landowners to teach the lessons of capital, new capitalists would 
have to be introduced into the business of farming.54   
By attributing so much importance to capital and arguing that only an increase in 
capital could bring about an increase in production, the paper justified limiting access to land, 
reserving it for modern enterprising farmers who could apply capital to the land.  This 
argument was, of course, fundamental to the transformation in agricultural production the 
paper campaigned for and key to cementing capitalist relations of production.  Despite the 
dislocation and hardship ‘routine’ farmers faced, The Economist insisted high farming 
benefited everyone, including the agricultural population.  It confidently claimed that as a 
result of high farming and free trade there were “no ruined lands, but flourishing trade, better 
fed people, and the most hopeful prospects.”55   
Yet when farmers raised alarm over the effects of free trade, particularly the low 
prices they were receiving for their agricultural produce, The Economist vigorously opposed 
any assistance to farmers, including abatements of rent, government regulation of prices, or 
tax relief.  The paper alleged landlords who charged low rents were “remnants of 
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feudalism.”56  It was a dangerous delusion, it argued, for farmers to rely upon a reduction of 
rents in place of those improvements which would increase the quantity of produce.  Reduced 
rents would allow farmers to carry on farming as they always had, and by permitting this 
“inferior race of farmers to hold land at low rents” the result would be “great national 
calamity.”  The paper even argued that if landed property was rightly managed, simply as 
property, so far from any general reduction of rent being necessary, a foundation could be laid 
for a steady and progressive increase of rent, because it would be derived from the increased 
prosperity of the tenant.57   
For The Economist higher rents had beneficial effects: they were a stimulus to 
improvement and would force the farmer to re-consider the terms of his holding and his 
system of culture, and “then he would strive to place himself in a condition to compete with 
the best farmers.”58  High rents would, in other words, stimulate labour and encourage tenants 
to work harder.  Likewise, the paper justified low prices by arguing that when prices were 
low, farmers would be ‘led’ to adopt a system of high farming, which, by intensifying 
production, would give them more profit than they had previously obtained under higher 
prices.59  As well, The Economist reminded its readers that industry bore all burdens.  A land 
tax impeded no industry and did not stop the creation of wealth, but a tax on wool or cotton 
stopped manufacture, lessened employment, and impeded national progress.  Therefore, tax 
relief for farmers was “not feasible.”60  Overall, what appeared as economic conflicts – high 
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rents, low wages – were veiled forms of pressure to induce farmers to give up their old system 
of farming and compel them to adjust to working for wages and procuring their goods on the 
market.61 
Farmers also complained that while any protection to the farmer was denied, cotton 
and woolen manufacturers were protected against the foreigner.  The simple answer to this, 
replied The Economist, was that the statement was not true.  The superiority which 
manufacturers possessed was derived only from their own energy, perseverance, and skill.62  
In actuality, Britain’s textile industry was created with the help of indirect wage subsidies and 
was sheltered from Indian imports in the 17th and 18th centuries by tariffs of nearly 100 
percent.  Only after it had become the world’s most efficient producer did it dismantle those 
walls.  Even at the height of free trade in the late 19th century, Britain’s Indian empire 
remained an important exception, with markets for various industrial goods essentially closed 
to the non-British.63  The Economist thus obscured the government intervention used to assist 
industry and argued farmers were safe to rely only on their own skill, ingenuity, and capital.  
They only had to set about farming “the same way and in the same spirit as the factory people 
set about manufactures and they could defy the competition of the world.”  According to the 
paper, they would succeed if they entered “heartily into the great industrial movement 
commenced by the commercial classes” and regarded land as “an object of commercial 
enterprise, to be managed solely with a view to profit.”64  
Although The Economist claimed it was a voice of reason, its arguments regarding 
high agriculture were often contradictory and illogical.  What was clear, however, was that 
this system of farming was intended to remove those who did not have the means to farm 
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highly.  Despite all evidence that this mode of production was not logical or favorable for 
everyone, the paper spread faith in it by praising its productive superiority and victory over 
nature, hunger, ignorance and tradition.  It extolled the virtues of fertilizer, mechanization, 
and capital and claimed that under high farming, “agriculture advanced far more rapidly than 
it would have done in the hands of small farmers.”65   
The Ideal Size of Farm 
To continue its rationalization of capitalist agriculture, and inequality, the paper 
engaged in frequent discussions on the ideal size of farms, seeking to prove why England’s 
large estates were superior to small farms.  The Economist began these discussions with a 
series of articles in the late 1840s that focused on refuting the arguments of M. Passy and his 
work Large and Small Farms, and their Influence on the Social Economy.  A former Minister 
of Commerce in France, Passy detailed a number of criticisms of large farms that became 
more common a century and a half later when people began to try to explain the failure of 
development strategies in underdeveloped countries, strategies that had borrowed much from 
the British example.  
  Passy questioned the belief that a small number of cultivators indicated a high 
standard of farming.  Was it desirable that farming should only occupy a few families while 
other industries employed proportionally more, he asked?  If the least advanced countries only 
displayed a small degree of industrial life and activity, he argued it was not, as had been 
supposed, because agriculture occupied too many hands, but because the skill and resources 
applicable to other enterprises were wanting.  Passy also disagreed with the argument that 
large farms contributed more than small ones to the well-being of the labourers they 
employed.  Rather, he pointed out, on large farms there were few masters and many labourers; 
on small farms there were more of the former and fewer of the latter.  Controlling their own 
                                               
65
 “Some Considerations on the Size of Farms,” The Economist, October 30, 1847, pp. 1245-1247. 
74 
farm, though small, provided farmers with independence and elevated their social position, 
while it insured that there was little social difference between the farmer and his labourers.  In 
all, Passy was arguing for an integrated agricultural system that reduced class differences.  
This was in direct opposition to The Economist’s preference for a system that increased class 
differences and created a mobile, but controlled, labour force.  Passy’s claim disputed the 
paper’s argument that constant and regularly paid agricultural wages would do more for the 
comfort and advancement of labourers than the “precarious independence” of peasant 
farming.66   
Passy also maintained that changes to England’s agricultural system, by depopulating 
the countryside, reduced the number of rural consumers for England’s manufactures.  With a 
system of cultivation that would support more labourers, he argued England would have 
attained an equal prosperity and would not have left “the masses exposed to numerous 
sufferings upon that very soil where are collected the most colossal capitals that ever vivified 
and remunerated labour.”67  He felt it was a mistake to assume that the fewer hands the earth 
employed, the more would be left to be employed in trade and commerce, or that the fewer 
cultivators there were in a country, that manufactures would then thrive.  This challenged The 
Economist’s argument that shifting labour from agriculture to manufactures relieved the land 
and resulted in Britain’s freedom and prosperity.   
Passy believed the support for inequality espoused by The Economist was partly the 
result of a prejudice for the ‘order’ evident in large farms in opposition to the ‘disorder’ 
inherent in peasant production, regardless of differences in productivity: 
Great farms have, above all others, in their exterior aspect, wherewithal to beget a 
prejudice in their favour.  Owing to the considerable capitals which they require, the 
persons who hold them, rich and well educated, have habits and tastes of a higher 
order; and everything connected with their domestic arrangements attests a 
superiority, which is presumed to extend to their system of farming.  And, then, those 
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immense fields sown entirely with one kind of crop – those vast inclosures in pasture 
where a number of animals are fed – that plurality of labourers engaged on every piece 
of work – all these appearances are associated with ideas of order, activity and 
abundance, delight the eye of the observer, and cannot fail to leave a favourable 
impression. . . . Great farms possess an advantage which often manifests itself in the 
most striking and attractive manner.68 
 
The Economist’s response to such criticisms was primarily to argue that the changes to 
English agriculture were natural and beneficial, the result of the increased application of 
capital to land.  An increase in the size of farms was the natural tendency of increasing wealth 
and prosperity, the paper claimed.  Large farms were simply evidence of a general progress, 
proof that the middle and upper classes were advancing in opulence.69  That the labouring 
classes did not advance with them, that they multiplied even faster than the new arts could 
provide for them, was “not the consequence of the extinction of small farmers, but of other 
circumstances.”  Large farms did not cause the poverty of labourers, in fact, it claimed, 
without the wealth large farms created, and without employment in manufactures, the 
labouring classes would either have multiplied much more slowly, or they would have been a 
great deal more degraded than they had become under the consolidation of land.70  
Fortunately for England, commerce and manufactures had been opened to her people and they 
had “swarmed from the land into towns”; they had left agriculture for other means of 
subsistence and the land “remained divided into useful, convenient, and profitable portions.”  
For if there were no other occupations than farming open to men, they would fight or murder 
one another for possession of land, which would end in a minute subdivision of the soil, such 
as had taken place in France and Ireland.  The only means of counteracting such powerful 
motives, the paper claimed, was to remove every restraint from industry and to set trade 
entirely free.  Thankfully the English had done this, The Economist noted, and were “not 
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hutted on the soil, as in Ireland,” they had “not cut it up into roods, as in France,” and had not 
turned “every park in the empire into potato gardens.”71 
The Economist added that the genius of the people had much to do with determining 
their system of husbandry.  “The English farmer was not content to expend so much skill and 
energy for the sake of such a bare subsistence as must ever be the lot of the small farmer.”72  
The paper argued England’s division of classes into landowners, tenants and labourers was 
“an important onward step in the progress of civilization,” although that division had “not yet 
produced all the good it was capable of producing.”  It felt the arrangement of England’s 
agricultural classes into labourers for hire and capitalist occupiers of land who hired labour, 
was likely to be permanent.  It even went so far to say that this arrangement was not unsuited 
to the best interests of the labourers, as it was unquestionably the arrangement best adapted to 
advance the arts of husbandry and consequently large and cheap production.73  This was a 
clear attempt by the paper to make more palatable the non-voluntary division of labour.  
Not only were large farms a natural result of progress and increased prosperity, and 
beneficial to labourers, but according to The Economist, “it was utterly impossible to fix any 
rule for the size of farms.”  The paper argued the size of farms should be left to the decision of 
the individuals owning the land who, if left in perfect freedom, would do what was most 
profitable to them and thus what was best for the public.74  Trying to regulate the size of 
farms would only do more harm than good.  In short, The Economist was for settling the land 
entirely free from any laws.  “An absolute individual property in the soil, completely 
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unfettered,” seemed to the paper “to be consistent with reason and principle, and social 
progress.”75   
The Economist seemed to forget it had argued for only one type of land ownership – 
large capitalized farms – against other types.  The paper obscured the process by which 
England and Ireland came to have large capitalized estates; the consolidation of land had 
occurred not through some magic of the market but through Parliamentary acts.  It justified 
inequality by claiming it was a necessary stimulant to improvement and labour.  Furthermore, 
by portraying capital as having a fair and objective rule, and by arguing it was impossible to 
regulate the size of farms, the paper made an inequitable system seem natural and inevitable.    
To further prove the superiority of England’s large estates, The Economist often 
commented on the condition of the population in Ireland and France which “was so 
exclusively dependent on the land for subsistence.”  As a result, it claimed, the peasants in 
France were un-enterprising, un-improving, ignorant and poor.  France’s “infinitesimal 
patches of land” were cultivated in an uneconomical fashion, using spades and hoes, 
producing no profit.76  The French, the paper maintained, were at least a century behind 
England in agricultural science and skill; in France, agriculture was a handicraft rather than 
what it ought to be – a science.  Their style of husbandry was slovenly, their corn crops were 
by no means free from weeds, and the untidiness and discomfort of their dwellings could 
scarcely be exceeded.  Their habits were extremely penurious, they used much of their 
produce for food and clothing, they mainly subsisted on coarse vegetables rather than bread or 
meat, and they hoarded whatever money they could save.77  In all, the French were “bound 
down in the most abject submission to every custom, for no other reason than that it [was] a 
custom.”  There was “no struggling upwards, no longing for a better condition, no discontent 
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even with the vegetable food upon which they lived.  All over the land there brooded one 
almost unvaried mist of dull, unenlightened, passive content.”78  The Economist argued the 
French example proved to all countries that a minute subdivision of the soil and encouraging 
the bulk of the population to become, or remain as agriculturists, would only lead to bad 
farming and idleness.79   
 What the paper found particularly repugnant about subsistence farming was the “spirit 
of thrift” that diffused through the rural population.  Peasants, it argued, denied themselves 
“reasonable indulgencies” and “lived wretchedly, in order to economize.”  Among the French, 
the family of the peasant engaged in self-provisioning and produced nearly all they consumed.  
This was a social state, The Economist remarked, which afforded no markets and no class 
wealthy enough to employ a class of producers of objects for them to purchase.  The effect 
was that it obliterated those branches of industry which produced the luxuries and elegancies 
of a civilized life and, in the end, would lead to the extinction of foreign commerce.  As the 
paper noted: 
when we examine the household life of a Swiss, German or Auvergne peasant owner . 
. . these people are clothed, not in cotton from England nor in linen from Belgium, but 
in linen or woolen garments which are the produce of their own farms and their own 
looms; they consume no tea from China, no cigars from Cuba or Louisiana, no sugar 
from the West Indies, little coffee from the East; their tobacco is raised at home; their 
coffee is half chicory; their sugar is manufactured from beet-root; and their bad beer 
and sour wine are the growth of their own hop-garden and vineyard.80 
 
Peasant proprietors were unacceptable, therefore, because they threatened the health of both 
national and international trade.  As The Economist had already proved to itself the benefits of 
trade, no matter what was being traded, the self-provisioning of peasants, by definition, 
needed to lead to impoverishment and stagnation.  It argued a system of small ownerships was 
directly at variance with the principle of political economy which proclaimed that the division 
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of labour was essential to full efficiency of production.  For the paper, any system in which 
farmers acted uneconomically, or made non-market decisions regarding production, was 
archaic and not synonymous with improvement.  It claimed the whole division of land and 
establishment of people without capital on small farms was an “irrational custom.”81  Equally, 
the peasant proprietor was irrational, as he never calculated that he could procure in the 
market two bushels of grain for the price in seed and labour, when it only produced him one 
bushel on his own patch of land, and he never considered the wages which he would have 
received for half the amount of toil on the farm of a larger and wealthier proprietor.82  In all, 
the extra labour the peasant and his family bestowed upon their land was less effective than it 
would be if otherwise applied.  In this simple consideration lay, The Economist maintained, 
“the key to the whole mystery – the solution of one of the knottiest, most vital, and most 
interesting problems propounded to the nineteenth century.”83   
The Economist did admit that possibly a certain number of small farms could be 
beneficial as stepping stones, allowing frugal and intelligent agricultural labourers to rise to 
the rank of farmers.  However, these farmers needed to have the lessons provided by 
neighbouring large farms constantly at hand.  If the small farmer could only grow 25 bushels 
of wheat to the acre, while a large farmer grew 35 or 40 bushels, the small farmer had to “go 
to the wall” for he would not be able to pay the rent his land would be worth in the hands of a 
better cultivator.  “He must learn what his more opulent neighbours are doing and act 
accordingly”; his continued existence depended on his own progression, the paper 
maintained.84   
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The Economist denounced the security associated with the ownership of small plots as 
degenerating into poverty and destitution.  It claimed that because proprietors of small farms 
did not follow the principles of political economy they were ignorant and irrational, satisfied, 
and too little enamoured with consumption.  Inadequate consumption and self-provisioning, 
of course, were key barriers to the extension of a capitalist mode of production.  They were in 
direct opposition to The Economist’s preference for a division of labour that prevented people 
from directly providing for themselves, forcing them become dependent on the market for 
their daily needs.   
Once the rural poor in England had been dislodged from their ‘irrational’ methods of 
‘routine’ farming, dispossessed of land, and made dependent on the market, nothing was to 
interfere with the free working of the market.  Instead, society was to be shaped in such a 
manner as to allow the market to function according to its own laws.85  Thus The Economist 
sought every possible opportunity to promote the new social division of labour and to engage 
people in productive work that would turn a profit for employers.  It stood on guard to ensure 
capitalist relations of production became firmly entrenched, hence, when measures were 
suggested that would support the rural poor’s ability to provide for themselves, the paper 
expressed an unremitting hostility toward them.  The Economist was especially opposed to a 
scheme of garden allotments for the rural poor.  
Garden allotments: a ‘dangerous and degrading scheme’ 
Between 1830 and 1850 there was a movement to reallocate small portions of land to 
the rural poor in the form of garden allotments.  Allotments in England originated as a 
response to the food shortages experienced during the Napoleonic Wars.  By 1830 the 
‘Captain Swing’ riots drew attention to the condition of agricultural labourers, who had 
launched a campaign for agricultural reform.  In its aftermath, hundreds were “transported” to 
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Australia for real or alleged participation in the riots.  The riots, however, also prompted the 
promotion of allotments as a plausible remedy for rural poverty and unrest.86   
Garden allotments were one of the most efficient cases of self-provisioning.  They 
were between one-eighth and half an acre, used low-capital, labour intensive methods such as 
spade culture, and employed whole families in producing potatoes and other vegetables.  
Allotments were used for subsistence; rarely, did labourers sell part of their produce.  They 
were economical and part of their advantage was the avoidance of the need to transport and 
market produce, which grew near the point of consumption.87   
Allotments were one of the few post-enclosure alternatives or supplements to wage 
labour available to the rural poor.  In fact, contemporary observers often saw the rise of 
allotments as a response to enclosure, and as performing a role comparable to common rights 
before enclosure.  All of the select committees and royal commissions which remarked on 
allotments, and most of the national and local press, were in favour of them as a remedy for 
alleviating rural poverty.88  John E. Archer argued that landowners were in favour of 
allotments because they would keep labourers from becoming dependent on the Poor Law.  
Boaz Moselle contended that when prices for agricultural produce were low, labourers could 
use small pieces of land more efficiently than farmers – so much more, in fact, that the gain 
from giving land to labourers outweighed the potential subsidy from using poor relief.89  
Others saw allotments as a valuable aid in forming moral character.  Initially allotments were 
given to the ‘deserving poor’ who demonstrated standards of honesty, industriousness and 
respectability, though they were occasionally offered to applicants of bad character in order to 
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show the reforming powers of the system.  As allotments became more general, however, 
stringent morality assessments became less important and land was made available to anyone 
who wanted it, though demand outstripped their supply.90   
While allotments provided a solution to the hardships the rural poor faced, they were 
also a source of contention.  Jeremy Burchardt, a leading authority on the English allotment 
movement, argued opposition to allotments amongst landowners was largely confined to 
those who felt an ideological commitment to political economy.  Political economists and 
their landowning followers objected to the provision of land for labourers arguing that it was 
a retrogressive plan with too much a resemblance to other “modes of disinterring feudal habits 
and feelings,” that it was “a sort of supplementary poor law,” and that it would be “the first 
step towards introducing the ruinous and depraved method of dealing with the land which had 
produced such evil results in Ireland.”91  They maintained it disturbed the clarity of the 
functional division between labourers, farmers, and landowners, and kept labourers reliant on 
land when they should depend on wages.  Most alarmingly, some argued allotments would 
increase population.  It was assumed that if labourers had land their better economic position 
would lead to earlier marriages and a rising birth rate.  Their offspring would choose to stay 
on the land, resulting in even greater subdivision of holdings and ultimately a ‘cottier 
population.’  Thomas Malthus, one of the most ardent defenders of private property, argued 
that if a system of allotments was made general it would result in a subdivision of holdings, a 
decline in the standard of living, and a catastrophic increase in population.92   
Some farmers also opposed allotments fearing labourers would expend all their 
strength on their plots.  Still, many farmers assisted labourers with cultivation of their plots.  
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Any hostility principally came out of a desire to keep labourers in a dependent economic 
position and to maintain a status distinction between themselves and labourers.  Overall, 
however, there was little to suggest that farmers or farming were seriously affected by the 
introduction of allotments.93 
The allotment movement gained considerable political prominence from 1843 to 1845 
and it was during this period that The Economist devoted many articles to the issue.  The 
paper denounced the allotment scheme as a “popular panacea for all the labourer’s ills.”  It 
was a “dangerous and degrading scheme, fraught with the most serious and frightful 
consequences,” it claimed.  Though it was popular and might initially “heal the surface of the 
sore,” the paper argued the “rancorous venom” would effectually eat to the centre of the 
system.94   
The Economist’s objection to the allotment system was chiefly grounded on its 
tendency to “stagnate labour” and thus obstruct the labour market.  The paper argued that if 
extensively carried out, allotments would fix the labouring class to a particular spot and 
would accumulate labourers where they were already in superabundance.  The consequence 
would be to further reduce wages in these districts and deprive the country of “so much 
productiveness in other pursuits in which it might be profitable.”  It argued labourers’ welfare 
depended on their being able to freely circulate to those areas most needing their labour.95   
Not only would allotments prevent the mobility of labour, but like the political 
economists of the age, the paper claimed they would keep labourers dependent on land rather 
than regular employment and wages.  The Economist was in favour of cottage gardens filled 
with hollyhocks, sunflowers, and lavender as they were possessed for pleasure and 
demonstrated an advanced stage of comfort, prudence, and an elevated character.  But the 
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allotment system demonstrated the opposite, it insisted.  In place of flowers were grown 
“rows of ill-cultivated potatoes, or other matter-of-fact vegetables.”  Allotments, with their 
“character of stern utility, of substitute for wages, of last source of subsistence,” were 
evidence of “the deepest poverty and the last stage of dependence,” it claimed.  While the 
cottager’s garden was a comfort which he commanded in addition to, and by consequence of 
his earnings, allotments were a substitution for regular employment and wages.96   
The Economist strongly felt labourers should depend more on wages and less on the 
yield of their own small plot of soil.97  Labourers in England, it argued, could not draw from 
the cultivation of small allotments of land, unaided by implements, manure, draining, and 
other improvements, an income equal to the wages they received by combining their labour 
with a farmer’s capital.98  Labour was always more productive when combined with capital, 
“than when left to its own clumsy and unassisted expedients.”  The Economist maintained that 
as long as there were cultivators with capital to pay money-wages, any pursuit for which the 
labourer was not paid should be instantly abandoned.99   
The Economist also argued allotments unjustifiably interfered with property and led to 
the tendency of an agrarian law which was inconsistent with that which increased production 
– the division of labour.  Agricultural improvement and extension in the size of farms, it 
maintained, had made the division of labour much more perfect, but the effect of allotments 
would be that a man might work ten hours a day on a large farm at hedging or ploughing, and 
complete his day by working two hours on his allotment, not doing what he was most skilled, 
but doing a little of everything.  Those two hours, The Economist pointed out, would not be as 
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productive or profitable as if he had worked 12 hours on the farm.  The real sin, however, was 
that the labourer would reserve some of his strength for the cultivation of his allotment, and 
thus his employer would not “have all the sweat of his brow.”100  
For The Economist, the only way labourers could be elevated was through constant 
waged work.101  It believed labourers’ poverty was due to insufficient employment, and that 
to allow people the means to produce for their own needs would only generate a widespread 
pattern of indolence.  The Economist feared labourers would rather engage in self-
provisioning than participate in the labour market; an increasing number of people employed 
in self-sufficient farming would reduce the number available for the production of surplus, 
and profits would suffer as a result of a return to spade husbandry.102  Thus it lashed out at the 
scheme of allotments as nothing less than an assault on civilization and portrayed anyone who 
resisted wage labour as an enemy of progress.  The proponents of allotments, it claimed, 
opposed “the development of society,” would “doom the people to ignorance and slavery,” 
and “prohibit them from profiting by the splendid discoveries of modern intellect.”103  It even 
argued that the allotment system was one of the causes of the downfall of the Roman Empire 
and a reason for the French Revolution.  History demonstrated, The Economist believed, that 
allotments would inevitably result in having food doled out to people as beggars, as in Rome, 
or, they would rise up and take the land with vengeance and violence as had happened in 
France.104   
The Economist did later admit, in 1859, that well-managed allotments formed a means 
of improving the condition of the agricultural labourer.  But, it made clear, only when 
allotments were skillfully managed with much judgment and care did they become valuable.  
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It praised an example of an allotment field in Whitfield in which plots were offered according 
to labourers’ ability, not according to their need, and where some competition was found 
necessary to keep up the system.105   
Poverty as a Source of Wealth 
For The Economist, self-provisioning was nothing more than a residue of a savage past 
and it fought vehemently to prevent any attempts to ameliorate poverty using measures it felt 
were inconsistent with the modern-day principles of political economy.  It denounced all 
activity that did not conform to the norm of production by wage labour and denied the 
legitimacy and logic of any alternative vision of production.  At the same time, The 
Economist’s own vision of agricultural production was illogical and filled with contradictions. 
Though it claimed to espouse the principles of laissez faire, the paper was unwilling to rely on 
market forces to determine the division of labour.  It found the tenacity of the rural poor to 
engage in self-provisioning and their reluctance to work for wages particularly distasteful.  
That is, when the rural poor were ‘free to choose’ what in their minds was the most 
productive use of their labour, they almost always made the wrong choice and needed to be 
compelled to wage labour.  To make sure they accepted wage labour and would be unable to 
exist outside the market, The Economist championed an agricultural system that called for 
state interventions and blatant manipulations of the division of labour to restrict the rural 
poor’s ability to provide for their own needs.  This was a story of coercion through policies 
which made a continuation of the old ways impossible and created a state of deprivation, even 
while The Economist claimed its vision of rural change would benefit all.   
It was believed that once those who had engaged in self-provisioning became 
sufficiently impoverished, they would have no choice but to accept wage labour.  As a result, 
this created poverty did not reflect a disadvantage for capitalist development; rather, it was an 
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important tool for organizing society to its own interests.  Patrick Colquhoun, a London police 
magistrate noted: 
Poverty is that state and condition in society where the individual has no . . . means of 
subsistence but what is derived from the constant exercise of industry in the various 
occupations of life.  Poverty is therefore a most necessary and indispensable 
ingredient in society . . . It is the source of wealth, since without poverty, there could 
be no labour; there could be no riches, no refinement, no comfort, and no benefit to 
those who may be possessed of wealth.106 
 
Separating people from the means of production was an ongoing process but a 
necessary precondition for the creation of labourers.  Still, formerly independent farmers 
resisted severing their ties with agriculture.  They did not move easily to a new mode of 
production nor did they gladly adopt the role of low-paid agricultural or factory worker.  As 
the market was incapable of breaking down resistance to wage labour, measures were needed 
to force those who once engaged in self-provisioning to be integrated into the market.  
Though The Economist embraced the proposition that once ‘freed’ from their ties to the land, 
rational people understood the benefits of wage labour and were naturally disciplined to the 
market, it went to great lengths to support the institutions of society that would eliminate 
remnants of the preexisting mode of production and foster submission to wage labour.  The 
next chapter makes this contradiction clearer.107  
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CHAPTER THREE - ‘Drawing Forth the Force Which Slumbers in the Peasants’ Arm’ 
 In the wake of several centuries of harsh methods of primitive accumulation, the 19th 
century wage relationship seemed a voluntary affair.  In reality, the underlying process was 
far from voluntary.  Karl Polanyi argued that in the 19th century a new institutional 
mechanism was starting to act on England – the establishment of the self-regulating market 
economy.  The intent was that society would be re-ordered so that the market could operate 
freely, and more and more aspects of life would be subordinated to the interests of capital.  In 
order to accomplish this, measures were needed that would discipline labour to the market, 
increase the quantity of labour and improve its efficiency, and train people to have more 
needs.1     
Another important component was that society needed to remove the long held belief 
that poor relief was the right of those who had no subsistence.  The poor had lost rights to 
subsistence through the enclosure movement and their common rights were criminalized 
throughout much of the 18th century.2  Both enclosures and the criminalization of common 
rights were forms of social control, based on a belief that it was necessary to induce the poor 
to labour and regulate their labour.  By the 19th century all that remained of the idea that the 
poor had any right to subsistence were the Poor Laws; the focus of much of 19th century 
political economy became an attack on these laws.  Political economists were assisted by the 
Reverend Thomas Malthus who, perhaps, provided the most persuasive argument for an 
attack on the poor’s last entitlement – an argument based on a paranoid fear that the poor had 
a tendency to propagate and any assistance would, by alleviating their poverty, allow them to 
continue to breed, thus increasing misery.  Political economy became obsessed with the 
dangerous class of the poor: the non-labouring poor, or paupers.3  According to Gertrude 
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Himmelfarb, paupers were seen as dangerous because they represented a “perverse refusal to 
abide by the ethos” of the new rationality of wage labour.4   
Michel Foucault also maintained the pre-industrial solidarities of the poor were a 
danger as they represented an “anti-society” which blocked the free circulation of labour and 
capital through their “chronic deficit of interest,” their “refusal to make the passage from 
penury to well-being,” and their stubborn indifference to regular wages, increased labour, and 
expanded consumption.  The poor, in other words, represented the threat of under-
consumption; they embodied the danger of subversion by their refusal to move from self-
provisioning to wage labour, and they endangered the system of capitalism itself.  Foucault 
argued that in order to turn the poor into individuals concerned with their own well-being and 
upward mobility, modern mentalities had to be implanted within them through 
‘governmentality’.  These mentalities were cultivated in people through subtle ‘disciplinary 
mechanisms’ or ‘techniques of government’.  Disciplinary mechanisms, such as education, 
shaped, guided, and corrected the conduct of a population and fostered self-discipline.  
Though they assumed the happiness and well-being of people as their end, ultimately they 
were designed to form ‘proper’ or ‘good’ citizens.  Timothy Mitchell argued this process of 
building citizens was a kind of colonialism wherein the power of the state was diffused as it 
infiltrated and re-ordered the population.5  It was this political process – a process of primitive 
accumulation – that accompanied the 19th century capitalist transformation of rural England.6   
The Economist’s concerns fit into a tradition of fear and concern about the poor.  The 
paper was interested in the creation of a labour force that was disciplined to the market, but 
was unwilling to leave the fate of capitalism to market forces as it did not trust the free choice 
                                               
4
 Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age (New York: Vintage Books, 
1983), pp. 101, 523-527. 
5
 See Colin Gordon, “Government rationality: an introduction,” pp. 10, 38, Foucault, “Governmentality,” pp. 87-
104 and Procacci, “Social economy and the government of poverty,” in The Foucault Effect, pp. 155-158 as well 
as Mitchell, Colonizing Egypt, pp. 33-35. 
6
 Marx, pp. 899-900. 
90 
of the rural poor.  They were irrational and ignorant of their own misery, the paper claimed, 
and their stubborn reliance on traditional solidarities, their limited material needs, and 
resistance to the approved norm of production by wage labour were evidence of their moral 
defectiveness.   
The Economist, though a proponent of laissez faire, supported the techniques of 
government described by Foucault.  It did so by claiming the rural poor would benefit from 
education, ‘decent’ homes, and a strict administration of the Poor Law.  This chapter argues 
these were spaces that would shape the behaviour of the rural poor, coaching them to a 
discipline of work, frugality, sobriety, and good order.  These disciplinary mechanisms were 
to transform them into ‘good’ citizens – citizens that could be integrated into a modern 
national economy.  Because it was not the rural poor The Economist wrote for, the paper 
sought to convince its influential readers – government and business leaders – of the need to 
press forward and ensure that the rural poor had no alternative but to embrace wage labour.  
The Economist hoped to restrict the rural poor’s ability to promote “counter-conducts”, or 
forms of behaviour that were not amenable to capitalist relations of production. 
Developing ‘a taste for labour’ 
To justify the subjection of the rural poor to harsh measures of discipline and control, 
The Economist invoked the need to stamp out sloth and indolence.  It repeatedly portrayed the 
rural poor as slow to change, ignorant, “rough” and “not . . . the clearest headed members of 
the community.”7  It claimed they were idle, rebellious, sentimental, and improvident.  The 
paper denounced this behaviour, because it endangered the working of the market, and 
blamed the rural poor for holding back Britain’s progress.  In order for capitalism to advance 
and Britain to develop, it argued the rural poor either needed to be coerced into more effective 
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labour and forced to abandon their previous solidarities, or they had to give way to those with 
capital.8 
The Economist was particularly perturbed by what it felt was the rural poor’s idle 
nature.  They shrunk from the extra exertion modern husbandry demanded; they were content 
to “rub along without much trouble . . .  and they won’t stir themselves if they can avoid it,” 
the paper complained.  It noted that competition and changes in the mode of conducting 
business had long ago compelled the traders and shopkeepers of the manufacturing districts to 
give up the abundant leisure of closing their shops at four o’clock in the afternoon and 
amusing themselves at ale-house or cricket matches.  Now they strove and pushed business 
with an energy and perseverance at one time not dreamt of as necessary or possible.  The 
paper argued farmers needed to learn from the shopkeepers’ productiveness.  It warned that 
though farmers had “shut up at four o’clock” and taken it easy, they would now, under the 
operation of competition, find out that they had to, and could, “exert themselves with more 
effect than they ha[d] hitherto done.”  Though when faced with the prospect of diminished 
ease, The Economist noticed the farmers did not accept the need for more energy without 
murmur.9   
  In pre-capitalist times, the rural poor had enjoyed a great deal of free time.  They 
maintained many religious holidays and festivals to break up the routine of work and 
preferred leisure over the small value they could obtain from wage labour.  Despite these 
frequent holidays, they still managed to produce significant surplus.  However, as markets 
evolved, the claims on their labour multiplied and they had to curtail their leisure in order to 
meet the growing demands of non-producers.  The Economist, in its urging that the rural poor 
exert themselves, feared leisure would take precedence over production.  It sought to suppress 
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any idleness and to lengthen working hours so that they would be forced to work harder and 
longer, producing more for the market.  It did not seem to occur to the paper that the rural 
poor might be behaving in a perfectly rational manner in preferring leisure to the increased 
consumption wages would allow.10 
In addition to their taking it easy, The Economist complained that the rural poor were 
very much the creatures of routine and too content with their situation.11  It claimed they were 
generally “too much disposed to cling with unreasoning tenacity” to old methods of farming;  
they were “apt to become so attached to their accustomed practices, as not to heed the 
advances and improvements of which such practices [might] be capable.”12  Routine 
practices, differing but slightly from those in use centuries before, were considered sufficient 
for raising agricultural produce.  While the better class of capitalist farmers was seeking 
improvement, the paper argued “it was long a standing reproach against farmers that they 
followed servilely and unreflectingly the practices of their forefathers, satisfied if they could 
live, without much hope or effort to improve their condition.”13  Something like prudent 
activity needed to be exercised, The Economist admonished.  The rural poor could not 
“suppose that the world and society [would] stand still for them; or that they [could] be 
exempted from the changes which, in the world’s progress, all industrial undertakings seem to 
be destined to undergo.”14  The paper repeatedly lamented that the great mass of farmers still 
consisted of men whose capital was small, whose activity was confined within the narrowest 
limits, and controlled by the strictest routine.  The great want of English agriculture, it 
maintained, was that men of more intelligence, activity, and capital than the great body of the 
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tenant-farmers who currently occupied the soil, should turn their attention to husbandry.  It 
was encouraged that in Lancashire, there were amongst the landowners “new men coming 
from the towns, bringing with them business experience and active habits which they had 
acquired in their former occupations.”  From such men there was more to be hoped for than 
from old classes of proprietors.15   
The Economist condemned all behaviour that did not yield a maximum work effort 
and was clearly frustrated with the rural poor’s lack of desire to improve their situation or 
increase their wealth.  The paper was concerned with increasing their labour because their 
mentality of leisure, contentedness, and indifference to increased consumption was an affront 
to efficiency and a threat to capital’s need for greater surpluses and profits.  The economy 
could only prosper through the increased efforts of workers and through gains in efficiency.  
Thus the advancement of capitalism depended on the rural poor developing “a taste for 
labour”; it required “drawing forth the force which slumbered in the peasants’ arm,” or else it 
required forcing the rural poor from the land to make way for those who had capital and 
habits of industry.16   
Teaching Submission to the Laws of the Market 
The Economist was also disturbed by farmers’ protests and demands for protection.  
Commenting on a gathering of angry farmers in 1850, the paper argued such proceedings 
were only meant to alarm advocates of free trade; the farmers themselves were amongst the 
last classes who would gain anything by provoking outrage.  It noted that one of the points 
most insisted on by several speakers, and most applauded by the furious mob, was the 
assertion that farmers had a right to protection; they did not ask it as a favour, they demanded 
it.  Farmers were resolved, if they could, to dictate laws to the whole community.  But, the 
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paper pointed out, they intermingled their clamours for protection with denunciations of the 
tithe system and demands for the landlords to decrease their rents.  Such incongruity, it felt, 
demonstrated that the farmers were really much too angry to be aware of what they were 
talking about.17  Of course, the removal of protection and high rents were both intended to 
restrict small-scale farmers’ way of life and force them to work for wages, and thus were 
really quite congruent.  That they rebelled against the needs of capital and did not submit 
voluntarily to authority was the paper’s real worry. 
Farmers’ rebellion, their insistence that they had a right to live on the land, and their 
demand for higher prices, The Economist felt, set a most pernicious example and was 
dangerous for the whole community.  It accused the farmers of adopting the very worst 
doctrines of the socialists because they demanded  
that from the law which all experience has demonstrated no law can command.  The 
natural increase of population prohibits the attempt of every Legislature to provide 
employment and wages for all who are born in the land.  But the price of corn, the rate 
of profit on capital, and the rent of land, are all determined by natural laws, as certain 
and fixed as the relation between population and subsistence. . . . it is mere ignorant 
socialism to demand that the Legislature shall keep up the price of corn, or maintain 
rent at a certain height.18 
 
The paper remarked that even though protection had been overthrown and it was certain it 
could not be restored, even though protection “was contrary to justice and opposed to 
progress,” farmers, incredulously, still advocated for protection.19  It clearly feared their 
rebellion would inspire others to demand regulations that would further inhibit the workings 
of the market.  For The Economist, this was evidence of the farmers’ need for strict discipline.   
A lack of discipline was also responsible for labourers’ criminality, the paper believed.  
The Economist reported on several instances of arson in the countryside, attributing them to 
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labourers’ “tendency” and their “numbers.”20  While the paper admitted labourers were 
miserable and starving and their condition was incompatible with the safety of society, it 
maintained the most effectual and cheap method to relieve the labouring classes was “to give 
the people instantly perfectly free trade, and trust to them to provide for themselves.”  It 
argued that agricultural improvement and free trade would eventually bring prosperity, though 
this was a slow process.21   
Clearly the path to capitalist social relations was not a smooth one.  The rural poor, 
quite rationally, did not willingly accept a new system that was designed to dispossess and 
subdue them.  Thus discipline was needed to force them to submit to authority, and faith was 
required on their part to believe that they would eventually be brought to prosperity through 
the market.  According to The Economist, the rural poor needed to learn to respect and accept 
the laws of the market, even if those laws happened to impoverish them.22 
Shaking off their Feudal Habits and ‘Twaddling Sentimentalism’  
The Economist also strongly disapproved of any emotional or dependent ties between 
landlords and tenants, primarily because such ties interfered with the free play of the market 
in agriculture.  To rely on “customs of the country and a good understanding” between 
landlord and tenant, the paper argued, made the tenant inappropriately dependent on the 
landlord.  The tie between them was of a semi-feudal character, it complained, the one class 
looking for, the other affording patronage or protection.  The consequence was “to lower the 
standard of capital and enterprise among farmers and to prevent landowners from regarding 
their estates simply as property.”  In fact, these ties were such a problem, The Economist 
claimed, that a man of education, who regarded the hiring of a farm as a merely commercial 
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contract in which there was no obligation or dependence on the one side or the other, found it 
extremely difficult to obtain a farm.  This feudal-like system also bound labourers as tightly to 
the soil as ever they were bound.  According to the paper, such sentimental ties were the bane 
of agriculture as an advancing business and needed to be totally shaken off.23   
In the course of numerous debates on the Corn Laws, the protectionists had argued 
that the relation between landlord and tenant ought not to be a purely commercial relation.  
The free traders, on the contrary, had maintained that the relation between landlord and tenant 
should be a purely commercial relation – that one had only to consider how much he could 
get, and the other how little he could give, and that both were bound by the advantage which 
the rest of society conferred on them in the exclusive ownership and use of the soil, to make 
the land supply as much food at as small a cost as possible.24  Like the free traders, The 
Economist claimed any mutual confidence between landlords and tenants, generous owners 
and confiding occupiers, was nonsense, “the mere echo of a departing prejudice.”  
Accordingly, it argued that the greatest service which could be conferred upon agriculture was 
to dispossess landlords and tenants of all “twaddling sentimentalism.”25   
The Economist maintained that once the “artificial bond of a common interest” had 
been destroyed, “the commercial relation could come into full operation.”26  Within this 
commercial relation, the paper argued the ‘tie’ the tenant required was a clear, definite, 
rational, and secure contract for the possession of a farm for so long a period as to enable him 
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to use his capital to the best advantage.27  Landlords, on the other hand, could promote the 
good of their tenantry, district, and the community at large, The Economist maintained, by an 
enlightened pursuit of their own self-interest.  Where landlord and tenant relations were 
strictly confined to the mere terms of a bargain, and where the principle of self-interest 
prevailed, the improvements in husbandry were the greatest, it claimed.28  The paper urged 
landlords to conform to the exigency of the times.  They could not “lag in the career of 
civilization, and expect to reap the gains of those who lead it onward.”  Either land should be 
dealt with on commercial principles or it should go out of cultivation, The Economist argued; 
there was no medium.29  It noted that the men accustomed to commercial affairs were most 
likely to adopt a rational method of managing landed property.  The paper pointed out that 
some of the great merchants of Britain who had become landowners generally proved better 
business managers of landed property than hereditary proprietors.  The reasons The 
Economist gave were that merchants were comparatively free from local, family, and class 
prejudices, they possessed the systematic habits of business, and they had capital.30 
The Economist was advocating for agriculture to become more of a business and less a 
way of life.  Under a business system, the land was to be subordinated to the needs of a 
rapidly expanding urban population, landlords’ relations with their tenants were to become 
more distant and exploitative, and capitalist relations of production were to prevail over any 
other social relations.  As the paper argued: “individuals should be freed as much as possible, 
and as quickly as possible, from any restraints on their actions as individuals.  All old claims 
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over the soil, arising from feudal times and interfering with industry should be given up.”31  
Again, either the rural poor were to adhere to the laws of the market, or they were to give way 
to those with capital, who understood and followed these laws.   
The Economist was concerned, too, with the semi-feudal relationship between farmers 
and local agricultural societies.  It was in favour of large agricultural societies such as the 
Royal Agricultural Society and the Highland Society which embraced very extensive districts 
and promoted improvement.32  Of the 700 or so local societies and farmers’ clubs, however, 
The Economist could not speak favourably.  They were so entirely local, so completely 
dependent on the exertions or patronage of an individual or two, and were mere political 
engines in the hands of local proprietors, it claimed.33   
The Economist mostly ridiculed these local agricultural societies for offering prizes to 
labourers for the best work in their respective employments, again primarily because the 
paper believed they interfered with a rigorous application of market forces.  It argued their 
effect in promoting skill was minimal; nothing really created skill amongst rural labourers but 
a demand for skilled labour.  Prize-giving was just childish interference, the paper claimed; 
rather, the more they encouraged “genuine individual manliness in labourers, with a higher 
sense of individual responsibility,” the more likely they would be to obtain the kind of labour 
that steam-power needed.34  It maintained these types of prizes belonged to a different phase 
of social life than that which they had now entered upon.  Working men and women were no 
longer “semi-serfs” but were influenced by the same motives as other classes of the 
industrious.  They could sell their labour to the best markets open to them, and they suffered 
from their own imprudence and benefited from provident conduct as other classes did.  
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Besides, the paper argued, the best prize a farmer could get was to make money by his 
business; if the prizes which industry and intelligence applied to husbandry could not 
stimulate the farmer to farm well, he could never be made a good farmer.35  
The paper was happy to see these local societies dying out and claimed this 
demonstrated the growing independence of the working agriculturalist.  Farmers were 
becoming smarter and better ascertained “the absurdity of the tales of foreign competition by 
which they were once deluded.”36  The Economist was hopeful that the age of passionate 
protectionist politics was ending and they now seemed to be approaching “a more rational 
state of things.”  It urged for agriculture to be completely removed from the domain of 
politics as it claimed all the questions now affecting husbandry in Britain were economical; 
anything unconnected with the economical use of land was detrimental to the progress of 
agriculture.37   
The Economist was thus clearly arguing for the kind of change discussed most 
forcefully by Polanyi; for one in which society and all that entailed was bent to the will of the 
market rather than the reverse.  Social relations were to become disembedded from economic 
relations and the market was to be the motivator of people’s behaviour.38  Therefore, any 
work that was not performed for wages was not respectable, and prizes, passionate political 
ties, or traditional solidarities were hindrances to the free working of the market.  An 
objective attitude was to be the model of behaviour for the modern individual.  The Economist 
assumed that people would abide by economic rationality and that all contrary behaviour, 
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such as working for prizes, was unnatural or the result of outside interference.  But this ‘new 
phase of social life’ in which people could sell their labour did not arise spontaneously, it 
required disciplinary actions that would subordinate people to the market and ensure a 
steadily increasing flow of wage labour. 
Elevating Their Moral Habits 
In addition to their idleness, rebelliousness, and sentimental ties, The Economist felt 
other degrading habits indicated a need to discipline the rural poor.  It argued rural labourers’ 
standard of comfort was still extremely low; they were not frugal or provident, and 
drunkenness was a very prevalent failing amongst them.39  One of the indications of their 
uncivilized condition which the paper frequently reported on was the social problem of 
‘harvest-homes’, which in reality, it claimed, were often rude, rough, noisy drinking bouts by 
which the conclusion of the harvest was commonly celebrated in the countryside.40  It 
discussed the various attempts made to rid rural society of these celebrations: substitutes such 
as quiet suppers and tea-drinking parties, the promotion of education, and the encouragement 
of well-regulated and real festivity such as sports, in which all classes could participate.41  The 
Economist argued harvest homes were attempts to revive the past rather than well-devised 
efforts to elevate the rural labourers.  “They much want elevating, it is true,” remarked the 
paper, “but by less jaunty, we had almost said childish means than pastimes and fireworks.”42   
 Many letters printed in The Economist also complained of labourers’ improper habits 
and moral degradation.  Rev. Mr. Surtees noted that with a population of 1,100 he had only 
eight children at school above the age of 10 years; nearly every child above six or seven years 
was employed in field work.  He felt they could not allow the labouring population to grow up 
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without any taste for intellectual pleasures or else “the whole man became animal, his habits 
and tastes sensual.”  The labouring man’s idea of pleasure became limited to “beer and 
skittles”, and “his holydays were days of drunkenness.”  If he married, his bride was in the 
“family-way”; he signed his name with a mark; if out of work, he went without any feeling of 
disgrace; if sick, the parish fed him and the parish doctor attended to him; when aged, the 
parish supported him; when he died, the parish buried him.43   
Other letter writers especially lamented over what could be done to put an end to 
labourers’ drunkenness.  The Economist replied that there was little to be done except to avoid 
as much as possible the giving of drink as part of the wages, and to encourage reading and 
education.  It claimed that nothing but thrift and a reasonable abstinence from immediate 
enjoyment, too generally wanting amongst them, was required to raise the working population 
in the social scale.  While beer and tobacco were certainly temptations which led astray many 
of the rural working men, the paper felt this merely touched the surface of the matter; there 
were other causes of rural demoralization such as the miserable condition of housing.  
Overall, the desire to suppress drunkenness amongst rural workmen, it claimed, called 
attention to some very entrenched social evils in the rural districts.  The paper believed that 
the evils lay deeper than could be reached by any of the remedies it had seen suggested.44   
Again, The Economist did not seem to take into account that labourers might consider 
leisure more appealing than a life filled with continuous labour, or that it might be completely 
rational for labourers to deem celebrations more important than money.  Of course, this 
mentality endangered the advancement of capital and its need for people to work harder and 
longer, not wasting any time in idle frivolity.  Indeed, the deeper evil the paper was concerned 
with was that labourers’ remained indifferent to the needs of capital and thus interfered with 
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the supply of labour.  The paper sought to instill in labourers’ different attitudes to life – 
attitudes that would encourage them to have fewer children, arm them with a capacity for 
delayed gratification, make them advocates of private property, and turn them into consumers. 
Toward the end of 1846, as the decay of the potato crop compelled more than usual 
attention to the condition of agricultural labourers, The Economist began an investigation into 
“who was to blame for the present condition of the bulk of the population.”  It would be 
difficult to find a more uncompromising expression of individual responsibility than is 
contained in this series of articles.45  The paper found that the labourers were really at fault for 
their own misery and that their unsatisfactory habits were the cause of this misery.  
Particularly, The Economist felt their selfish indulgences and waste in seasons of prosperity 
on horse races and beer shops, the freedom they clamourously demanded for themselves, and 
their senseless strikes and destruction of property were to blame.46  The paper also chided 
labourers for their improvidence, negligence, their fondness for spirituous drinks, their vices 
and crimes, and their ignorance, particularly of the “law of population.”  Malthus had argued 
that there was a ‘natural law of population’ which he described as the pressure of population 
on resources.  The poor’s apparent absence of the middle-class habits of prudence and self-
discipline or what Malthus called “moral restraint” resulted in them having too many children.  
He argued their over-breeding made them poor in the first place and resulted in famine or 
some sort of disaster because of overpopulation.  Moreover, he felt it was unlikely the poor 
would ever develop middle-class traits except through draconian measures.47  Likewise, The 
Economist argued that the rural poor’s habits were to blame for their own political and social 
degradation.   
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The Economist also held out hope that men could improve themselves – that they 
could possess property, attain elective franchise in towns, and live in respectable dwellings.  It 
claimed the removal of the Corn Laws, by abolishing “one great artificial barrier erected 
between man and the course of nature,” would help make all classes better acquainted with 
the ‘natural’ laws on which the welfare of society depended.  The Economist argued that free 
trade had secured to the labouring classes all the raw materials of physical well-being; all that 
was needed was a “wanting in themselves, the temperance to resist animal indulgence, and 
knowledge to understand their interest.”48   
The paper thus portrayed a market system as natural and any barriers to the free 
working of the market as artificial.  Yet the market did not come about spontaneously, it 
required government interventions to establish and maintain it.  Likewise, labourers had to be 
coerced, by impoverishment and through government measures, to increased labour and 
frugality.  But by laying blame for labourers’ misery on their own failings, The Economist 
could justify their need for discipline and control.  In general, it was frustrated with what it 
perceived was labourers’ misspent time on idleness and pleasure.  It was annoyed by their 
“habitual and general condition in seasons of abundance . . . when other classes ha[d] been 
yearly increasing in wealth and superfluity.”49  Labourers needed to adopt the industrious, 
frugal, and rational approach to life that was such an essential part of the capitalist spirit.  The 
Economist pointed to the middle classes as an example to follow; their pride was of successful 
industry and the dignity of an honest reputation, of strict conformity of dress, appearance and 
behaviour.  Their conversations were filled with discussions of the value of money and the 
modes of making it.  Nothing was more wonderful, the paper remarked, than the busy, 
industrious pride of the middle classes of London.50   
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 The Economist also examined the position of capitalists and landowners, and in the 
end, exonerated them of all responsibility.  Capitalists, the paper contended, strove to make 
the greatest possible profit and by those efforts extended the wealth of society.  A capitalist’s 
own wealth, as well, conferred direct benefits to the lower classes, for it provided the capital 
which was the source of labourers’ employment.  Landowners, it argued, were merely 
capitalists who had invested capital in land.  They were not to blame for the degradation of 
the lower classes, as it was clear that if land was not owned and improved, it could not be 
cultivated successfully.  Ownership of land was essential to the very existence of the classes 
whom the landowners were said to impoverish.  Besides, The Economist remarked, to be 
responsible for labourers would mix such “sentimental considerations with the conduct of 
business.”51    
Subsequently, the paper investigated the state, which, because it assumed to provide 
for the welfare of the people, made itself unwisely responsible for the happiness of the 
masses.  The Economist believed that the effects of legislation led to the general helplessness 
of the masses which then came to depend on the government instead of themselves.  A wise 
society was one which limited the role of government to the protection of life and property; 
anything beyond this interfered with the plan of ‘natural’ progress.  Self-interest, the paper 
maintained, was a universal law of nature, and if the pursuit of self-interest did not lead to 
general welfare, then no systems of government could accomplish it either.52  
The Economist portrayed the wage relationship as a seemingly voluntary affair – 
workers needed employment and employers wanted workers.  In reality, extensive 
interventions were required to restrict self-provisioning and force people to work for wages.  
Foucault argued that the “development and generalization of disciplinary mechanisms” 
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accompanied the earlier brutal processes of primitive accumulation.  Separating people from 
the means of subsistence and inducing them to labour was “supported by these tiny, everyday, 
physical mechanisms, by all those systems of micro-power that are essentially non-
egalitarian.”53  These disciplines provided more of a guarantee of submission to the market, 
and The Economist, in exact contradiction to its supposed principles of laissez faire, eagerly 
supported them. 
‘An Education to Give Them That Provident Frugality’ 
The Economist argued the rural poor would benefit from education, as it believed 
farmers were “slow to learn from mere example, they require[d] more practical teaching.”54  
The paper indicated that the real object of this education would be to “promote the increased 
application of capital to husbandry, which [would] raise the wages of agricultural labourers, 
by augmenting the demand for their services; and, next, by moral and industrial education, to 
give them that provident frugality.”55   
The Economist’s proposal for a program of rural education included scientific and 
educational lectures.  These types of lectures had been given to town audiences and the paper 
felt they were a suitable model to be replicated for rural audiences.  Though rural labourers’ 
habits of working separately and silently in the fields, and their “want of social 
communication,” perhaps made them less ready recipients of verbal instruction than 
townspeople, the paper argued these peculiarities were “a strong reason for giving them social 
instruction and so equalizing their fate.”  It thought labourers “would profit from occasions to 
kindle in them a desire of knowledge”; that for them to hear some plainly-written modern 
history, or some description of the progress of their friends or relations in Australia or the 
United States, or some notice of the growth of the arts by which they were clothed, would be 
beneficial.  Moreover, they should be encouraged to read newspapers, The Economist 
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maintained, and other such publications that would tell them what was going on in the world 
around them.  Every effort should be made, the paper believed, to enable labourers to acquire 
the mechanical parts of education, reading, writing, and arithmetic and such elementary 
knowledge as could be imparted during the short periods their children could devote to 
schooling.  The Economist concluded that the knowledge possessed by other men needed to 
be disseminated to the rural poor because “it [was] necessary for their welfare and the safety 
of the State.”56  
Though the paper argued labourers would profit from increased knowledge, formal 
education was only part of a wider political process of discipline and instruction.  It was not 
the miserable condition of the rural poor The Economist was concerned with, but that they did 
not feel the depth of their suffering or understand their need for improvement.  This mentality, 
as Foucault argued, endangered the system of capitalism.  Education, as a result, was one of 
the subtle, everyday techniques of government that would encourage the rural poor to 
abandon any pre-capitalist values and persuade them to adopt middle class aspirations.  
Education was to change the rural poor’s habits and instill new ways of thinking, making 
them more accepting of work discipline and teaching them to accept their lot in a capitalist 
system.  By means of education, the rural poor were to be made into modern citizens of well-
formed character, with traits of frugalness, sobriety, and, above all, industriousness.57  
 ‘More Commodious Cottages’ 
While education was occupying much of the public’s attention, The Economist argued 
nothing more effectually retarded the efforts of educating rural labourers than the degraded 
state of their habitations.  According to the paper, the chief requirement for the improvement 
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of labourers was a higher standard of personal comfort in their dwellings and social habits.58  
The paper, therefore, was a strong advocate for a material reconstruction of their homes.   
Timothy Mitchell’s discussion of colonialism in Egypt provides insight into The 
Economist’s interest in building new cottages for labourers.  In Egypt, Mitchell explained, the 
modern colonial state sought to govern the population through more diffuse power which 
required mechanisms that were measured rather than excessive and continuous rather 
than sporadic, working by invigilation and the management of space.  Besides 
schooling and the army, these mechanisms included such civilizing innovations as the 
supervision of hygiene and health, a military-style system of permanent rural policing, 
the building of model villages on new, privately-owned agricultural estates . . . At the 
same time as they were extended, these strategies were to become increasingly 
unnoticeable.59  
 
The rebuilding of villages was thus an inconspicuous, microphysical power; “a power that 
worked by reordering material space in exact dimensions and acquiring a bodily hold upon its 
subjects.”  Mitchell argued that this was a space in which the techniques of government 
attempted to create appropriate social citizens.60  The Economist, too, felt ‘decent’ homes 
would encourage the rural poor to adopt appropriate behaviour.  
The paper justified the need for new cottages by referring to an article on cottages in 
the Journal of the Royal Agricultural Society, which argued that while labourers had 
increased, cottage accommodation had diminished due to their standing in the way of farm 
homesteads, parks, roads, or agricultural improvements.  As well, cottages had been pulled 
down in areas where property was in the hands of a small number of landed proprietors in 
order to prevent labourers from obtaining settlements.61  The consequence was that labourers 
had congregated in villages and the smaller towns where their dwellings were often miserable 
and expensive.  The Economist argued this want of cottage accommodation for labourers was 
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a serious concern as miserable dwelling places deteriorated their moral and physical 
condition.62   
Others also commented within The Economist on the condition of rural labourers’ 
homes.  Lord Ashley maintained the cottages in the county of Dorset were “inconveniently 
small, filthy, and ill-drained”; they were “hotbeds of immorality and disease.”63  Cottages on 
many estates, according to the Duke of Bedford, were so deficient  
as to be inadequate to the removal of that acknowledged obstacle to the improvement 
of the morals and habits of agricultural labourers, which consist[ed] in a want of 
separate bed-rooms for grown-up boys and girls; and secondly, that the practice of 
taking in lodgers had led to still further evils.64   
 
The Economist went on to describe the Duke’s plans for new cottages: they were to built in 
pairs, five or six yards from the road, leaving a small space for a garden of flowers and herbs. 
The cottages were to render the occupants as independent of each other as circumstances 
would permit.  A separate entrance was to be made to each cottage and if further separation 
was desired, it could be accomplished by planting a fence between the cottages and making 
the water pump with a double handle to work both ways.  The entrance door was not to face 
the road, not only on account of its publicity, but because an indolent tenant was in the habit 
of throwing ashes and other refuse into a heap immediately before the doorway.  In the 
proposed plan a receptacle would be provided within a short distance of the door, in order to 
make such a practice unnecessary and inexcusable.  The Duke felt that to improve the 
dwellings of the labouring class, and to afford them the means of greater cleanliness, health, 
and comfort in their own homes, to extend education, and thus raise their social and moral 
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habits, were among the first duties, and ought to be among the truest pleasures, of every 
landlord.65   
The Duke’s plans for improved cottages clearly contributed to an appearance of 
structure and neatness that was important to improvers.  But not only did these carefully 
planned spaces create a sense of order, they also offered better surveillance, knowledge, and 
control of labourers.  By keeping labourers under close supervision on the estates of landlords 
rather than in nearby villages, greater power could be acquired over the workforce, offering 
the possibility of increasing their productivity.  This abundant labour force constantly needed 
to be managed and coerced into more effective, constant labour and control over labourers’ 
everyday habits would help to ensure this.66 
The Economist agreed with the Duke, arguing that landlords should promote the well-
being of labourers in primarily two ways: first, by letting their farms to tenant farmers on 
terms that would induce high cultivation, and secondly, by erecting upon their estates a proper 
number of cottages that they could rent out to labourers.  The cottages should be looked upon 
by the landowner as an expenditure that would benefit his property indirectly, by elevating the 
character and increasing the comforts of the labourers, and at the same time affording 
convenience to tenant farmers, the paper maintained.  Landowners could perhaps also do 
something to promote education and provident habits amongst the labouring class, it added.67  
The paper was frustrated, however, that landlords had to be responsible for improvements as 
labourers did not seem to care about the condition of their cottages.  “Comparatively little 
labour on their own part would remove some of the worst evils of their dwellings, yet they 
seldom think of making the least exertion for the purpose,” the paper complained.68  The 
Economist felt the same about labourers’ lack of inclination for personal cleanliness.  A 
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knowledge of the true value and enjoyment of a clean skin was absent among them.  It argued 
their lack of cleanliness could only be corrected by training the young to improved habits, and 
it believed this should be an essential part of the discipline of rural schools.69 
The Economist further proposed that every farm should be furnished with a certain 
number of decent cottages, let with the farm, in which the chief permanent workmen could 
reside.  The best plan, according to the paper, was to lodge single men with some steady and 
married labourer whose cottage was suitable; a single man would never be so well off or so 
likely to conduct himself well as where he lodged with a respectable married man of his own 
class.70   
Within this language of improvement resided strategies of order that, like the Duke’s 
plan, provided better control over labour.  But decent cottages were also meant to improve 
and control character.  Indeed, The Economist’s concern was aimed less at the health and 
comfort of the labouring classes than at constructing appropriate morality.  For instance, Ian 
Hacking argued separate sleeping quarters for parents and children were important to the 
codification of the rules of the nuclear family.  Thus the reconstruction of homes was a power 
that worked not only upon the exterior of the body but also ‘from the inside out’, by shaping 
morality.71   
 The Economist proposed that in addition to letting cottages with a farm, a certain 
proportion of cottages should be let directly by the landowner to the labouring man who 
would thus be able to serve sometimes one farmer and sometimes another without having to 
move from his cottage.  These cottages, it argued, should be let to “the most steady and 
intelligent labourers, and their occupation of them should be deemed an object of desire 
among the working population.”  Such cottages could, therefore, be built according to a 
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somewhat higher standard, and be furnished with better conveniences.  “The possession of a 
superior dwelling [was], undoubtedly, one of the means of elevating a labouring man, and, 
perhaps, even more, his family.”72   
Yet the paper seemed to fear making labourers too comfortable; it was concerned that 
their homes were of just the right size and construction, otherwise, they would not accomplish 
the purpose of controlling the labour and habits of labourers.  The Economist remarked that 
large dwellings were really not required by agricultural workmen who were constantly out of 
doors and absent from home during the day.  Besides, too large a house was sure to lead to 
taking in lodgers or using the space for fuel and the like, which was undesirable.  The attempt 
at improvement would be nearly useless if the cottages were made too well – if they went “so 
far beyond the notions of convenience entertained by the classes who occup[ied] them.”  The 
paper noted that in a report of The Association for Promoting Improvement in the Dwellings 
and Domestic Condition of Agricultural Labourers in Scotland, it was revealed that the habits 
of the people prevented their appreciating such cottages.  “In many parts of Scotland . . . 
having erected a few superior two-storied cottages, the peasantry will seek the most wretched 
hovels rather than sleep upstairs; and I have had these cottages standing empty on account of 
this for years,” Lord Kinnarid reported.73  This was evidence that labourers’ could, and often 
did, thwart attempts to turn them into appropriate citizens, but The Economist argued all this 
proved was that the most landlords could do was to provide plain and comfortable cottages; 
beyond this improvement, money would be thrown away.  It was so difficult to improve the 
habits of any class by external effort, the paper lamented, yet if landowners provided a 
sufficient number of cottages with convenience fully up to the requirements of the labourers, 
but not much beyond them, they would have done as much to improve the social condition of 
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the labourers as they would be able to accomplish by direct effort.74  The Economist did not 
expect improvements of the moral, mental, and physical condition of rural labourers to be 
produced by creating an exaggerated notion of what the dwelling place of the farming man 
ought to be.  “We look to increased employment, and its consequence, better wages, as the 
main element of that improvement, and the effect will be, first, a desire for better food and 
clothing, and, next, for a more commodious cottage.”75   
 The Economist praised Lord Radnor – one of the first financiers of the newspaper and 
a fervent opponent of garden allotments for labourers – for making great changes on and near 
his estate through high farming and new buildings.  The work that had been provided, the 
wages which had been paid, the habits of neatness and carefulness, and the honourable pride 
men had who were employed on or associated with such works, made them better servants 
and better members of the community, The Economist claimed.  By Lord Radnor’s influence 
and means, a nearby village had gone from a disreputable village, to one that challenged 
competition with any in the country.  The population, once dissolute and disorderly, was now 
respectable and contented; once half-employed and ill-paid, was now in constant work; dirt 
and destitution had disappeared and been succeeded by cleanliness and comfort.  As great a 
change had taken place in villagers’ abodes; the old, dark, dismal, unventilated cottages had 
given place to neat, roomy, well-constructed dwellings, each with every convenience and with 
every requisite for decency, according to the size of the families.  There was also an excellent 
school for their children, The Economist noted.76   
In all, though the paper claimed it was concerned with labourers’ well-being and 
health, a reconstruction of their cottages was a means of changing their social and moral 
habits and maintaining labour discipline.  “Decent” homes were another one of the subtle, 
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physical, disciplinary mechanisms Foucault described, a means to creating acceptable social 
citizens. 
A Strict Administration of the Poor Law 
 Perhaps there was no better way to force labourers into increased employment and 
regular wages than through a strict administration of the Poor Law.  Beginning in the 16th 
century, as a form of control directed especially against the great numbers of poor who had 
been displaced by enclosures, the British Parliament established a state-regulated ‘welfare’ 
program known as the parish Poor Laws.  A component of these laws was the 1662 Law of 
Settlement which gave responsibility of the poor to the parish in which they resided.  By 
1795, a destitute person had the right to ‘outdoor’ relief even if he had employment, as long 
as his wages amounted to less than the family income granted to him by the Poor Law scale, 
but only in his parish; a parish took no responsibility for those without settlement there.77  
Thus the Law of Settlement and the Poor Law did a number of things The Economist believed 
to be pernicious: it established people’s right to poor relief and prevented the mobility of 
labour and the establishment of a competitive labour market.   
The rates of poor relief soared in the 18th and early 19th centuries as the rural poor 
were cleared off the land to make way for capital.  There was also a hardening of public 
attitudes toward the poor.  Arthur Young articulated changing beliefs toward the poor when 
he claimed that “everyone but an idiot knows that the lower classes must be kept poor or they 
will never be industrious.”78  Changing attitudes toward the poor were perhaps demonstrated 
best by Malthus.  He argued the misery of those relying on poor relief arose from their own 
idleness, improvidence, and prolific reproductive habits.  Only hunger would spur the poor on 
to labour, he believed.  As debates over the Poor Laws increasingly focused upon the balance 
                                               
77
 See Polanyi, pp. 77-85, Porter, pp. 376-378, Post, pp. 183-186 and Ross, p. 11.   
78
 Arthur Young, The Farmer’s Tour through the East of England (1771), vol. 4, p. 361.  Also cited in Porter, p. 
377. 
114 
– or, rather, the newly feared imbalance – between wealth and the population rate, Malthus’ 
claims became prominent.    
In an essay entitled An Essay on the Principles of Population as it Affects the Future 
Improvement of Society, first published in 1798, Malthus maintained that food supplies 
increased arithmetically (1, 2, 3, 4, etc.) while population, when unchecked, leapt 
geometrically (2, 4, 8, 16, etc.).  The implication of this simple math was that human 
reproduction, as it outran the supply of food, would doom mankind to misery unless there 
were “positive” checks of famine or war, or “preventative” checks of moral restraint and 
delayed marriage.79  Essentially, Malthus maintained that nature, or the market, determined 
success and failure, wealth and poverty, and, therefore, such matters were not for state 
regulation but for individual responsibility.  He explained:  
A man . . . if he cannot get subsistence from his parents . . . and, if the society do not 
want his labour, has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact, has 
no business to be where he is.  At nature’s mighty feast there is no vacant cover for 
him.80  
 
Malthus was not concerned about a general population increase; rather, he was concerned 
with the proliferate habits of the poor, especially given their rights to relief through the Poor 
Laws.  These rights were dangerous, he argued, because they increased poverty and idleness 
and took away motives for sexual prudence, but also because they tied the poor to the parish, 
preventing the free circulation of labour.  Malthus, in fact, contemplated an end to poor relief 
entirely.  By removing the Poor Laws, without replacing it with any other legislation, the 
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market would be given charge of the poor.  If they found no work, or their work did not 
provide a living wage, they were ‘surplus’ population with no right to live.81   
The Economist adopted a stance only slightly less callous than that proposed by 
Malthus.82  For example, in response to demands that the poor rates be raised to a living wage 
in Ireland, the paper replied that:  
to pay them not what their labour is worth, not what their labour can be purchased for, 
but what is sufficient for comfortable subsistence for themselves and family. . . . Do 
they not see that to do this would be to stimulate every man to marry and to populate 
as fast as he could, like a rabbit in a warren – in other words, that to apply this to 
Ireland would be to give brandy to a man who was lying dead drunk in a ditch?83  
  
To discourage such behaviours it stipulated that wages, or the poor rates, should be kept low 
so that the poor would have to spend nearly all their time working just to remain alive.   
The Economist was particularly opposed to the Law of Settlement as it confined the 
rural labourer to his own parish.  The paper claimed it was plainly adverse to the interest of 
the labourer to be confined by a parochial settlement that interfered with the free circulation 
of labour, which, in a ‘natural’ state of things, would take place in the rural districts.  The Law 
of Settlement prevented a labourer from seeking employment where employment was most 
plentiful.  As such, it was directly at variance, it claimed, with the principle it supported – that 
“of putting the right man in the right place, or allowing him to find the right place for 
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himself.”84  What the paper was really opposed to was the fact that the Law of Settlement 
threatened the advancement of capitalism which relied on a shift of labour from rural areas to 
manufacturing. 
For The Economist, the Poor Laws and the Law of Settlement also kept the rural poor 
from developing the habits of self-reliance, industriousness, and forethought that were needed 
in a capitalist system.  The want of frugality and of means of advancing their personal 
comfort was “the great rock in the course” of rural labourers, the paper claimed.  They were 
unwilling to forego a present advantage or enjoyment for an ultimate benefit.  In too many 
cases, the large wages earned during the harvest would only afford the workmen more beer 
and the like, and probably leave them in the winter quite as poor as if they had not earned 
extra wages; then they resorted to relief afforded by the Poor Law.  It seldom happened that a 
poor man or family, “having once tasted the unearned bread supplied by the Poor Law,” could 
completely recover self-dependence.85   
The Poor Laws and Law of Settlement, the paper added, interfered with the progress 
of education and increased pauperism, with its usual companions, crime and disease.  This 
could be avoided, it argued, by imposing restrictions on relief and eventually affording relief 
only in such extreme cases and under conditions so stringent, that such relief would cease to 
be regarded by the working classes as an element in their calculations for the future.  The new 
Poor Law of 1834, which abolished outdoor relief in order to encourage mobility of labour 
and repealed the Law of Settlement, though not completely, accomplished this to some extent, 
the paper admitted.86  Still, The Economist felt the slightest possibility of relying on poor 
relief operated most injuriously on the habits of the agricultural population.87  A strict 
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administration of the Poor Law was, therefore, a disciplinary mechanism to force the rural 
poor to increased labour, to ‘free’ labour from its local attachments, to form industrious habits 
and self-reliance, and ultimately create ‘good’ citizens.   
The paper maintained that the agricultural districts had long been breeding-places for 
paupers; from them pauperism overflowed to the towns, and there, to a considerable extent, it 
was extinguished.  There could be no doubt that the spur of necessity was sharp as people 
increased, and wherever that was felt, as it was felt where competition was keenest, 
improvement necessarily ensued.  Quoting Mr. Pashley, who had examined pauperism in 
various countries, the paper claimed: “it has been in cities that all great movements tending 
towards civilization seem to have originated.”  In the end, The Economist was convinced that 
there was hope for the improvement of the rural poor only when they ceased being rural.88   
Though the intent was that society be re-ordered to allow the market to function 
freely, the rural poor resisted subordinating all aspects of their lives to a market system.  They 
demonstrated “counter-conduct” to the market system in their preference for leisure and 
celebrations, in their pre-capitalist social relations, and demand for rights and protection for 
their way of life.  The fact that the rural poor relied on relief, or during harvest home 
celebrations did as they wished with the money allowed them, was well illustrated by The 
Economist’s descriptions of their idleness, drunkenness, and improvidence.  The main 
obstacle to a free working of the market was the rural poor’s ignorance of their duties in a 
market economy: they did not take easily to the exertion modern husbandry required and were 
‘tightly bound’ to the soil.  It was the ignorance of their duties, and of the necessity of those 
duties, which made for their insubordination and inspired the ‘arrogance’ of their demands.  
As well, the rural poor’s indifference to improving their own well-being and their incapability 
of recognizing their suffering represented a refusal of the perpetual expansion of needs and 
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illustrated the difficulty of using need as an instrument of social integration.  In all, the rural 
poor’s different forms of conduct confronted the project of social order and progress.  Their 
different behaviours were not compatible with capitalist relations and made them difficult to 
incorporate as citizens; therefore, they were made the objects of discipline and control.89   
Although The Economist theoretically championed laissez faire, it supported the 
techniques of government that would work to create social citizens.  It advocated education to 
prepare the rural poor from a young age to have good habits and to spread fundamental 
notions of participation in the social order.  It promoted reconstructed cottages to act as forms 
of surveillance and control and to create appropriate morality, and a strict administration of 
the Poor Law to discipline the rural poor to constant labour.  Ignorant of their duties and 
needs, the rural poor needed systematic intervention in order to be integrated into the social 
order.90  This reality exposes The Economist’s basic contradiction: that a market economy did 
not come about through self-evident laws of nature; rather, the conditions for a market 
economy needed to be imposed through government power.  
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CONCLUSION 
The early Economist’s narrative of capitalist development in the English countryside 
was based on an 18th century Enlightenment idea of improvement that meant clearing away 
customs and traditions which constrained profit.  It was the rural poor who most obviously 
held onto old customs and practices; The Economist’s campaign for improvement, therefore, 
constituted an attack on them.   
As an advocate of laissez faire, the paper’s whole philosophy hinged on the idea that 
the dominance of the market was a natural outcome which would occur as soon as artificial 
political barriers were removed.  The paper claimed that market forces would naturally bring 
about the vast changes in the countryside that were needed for Britain’s progress.  Yet in 
direct contradiction to its claim, the paper advocated for government policies that would 
deprive the rural poor of the means of subsistence and coerce them into wage labour.  It was 
the process of separating people from self-provisioning and disciplining them to the market 
that Marx described as ‘primitive accumulation’.  
The Economist could, in part, portray changes in the countryside as natural because it 
had benefited from earlier methods of primitive accumulation.  Marx claimed there were 
different moments of primitive accumulation and that at times its methods depended on brute 
force.  Draconian methods were used from the 16th to 18th centuries in Britain to clear the 
rural poor from the land and force them into accepting the discipline necessary for a system of 
wage labour.  Throughout the 19th century, the process of primitive accumulation was 
furthered by the expropriation of land as well as by multiple, often more subtle, forms of 
technological repressions and disciplinary mechanisms.  Marx argued the history of the rural 
poor’s expropriation was “written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire.”1  He 
maintained all methods of primitive accumulation employed the power of the state “to hasten 
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. . . the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, 
and to shorten the transition.”2   
The Economist played an essential role in advocating for policies that furthered the 
process of primitive accumulation and secured capitalist relations of production.  The paper 
justified the growth of cities and encouraged the transfer of labour and wealth from the 
countryside to urban areas.  It threw its support behind the final campaigns for enclosure of 
common land and advocated the deforestation of waste lands.  It also argued scientific 
agriculture and a reformed private property regime were necessary for Britain’s progress.  The 
Economist maintained these changes were natural as society advanced and beneficial for 
everyone by relieving the countryside of paupers and dramatically increasing agricultural 
productivity.  In reality, these were methods of primitive accumulation that dispossessed and 
impoverished the rural poor and increased inequality.  Nor were these changes natural; state 
force was required to enclose land, shift capital to manufacturing, and open overseas markets.  
In its push for the collection of agricultural statistics, The Economist advocated that the state 
employ police methods and criminalize dissent in order to open the countryside to capitalist 
investment and foster the spread of capitalist relations of production.  The fact that farmers 
feared and resisted the changes The Economist advocated was evidence of repression. 
The Economist passionately promoted a system of farming that would also further 
primitive accumulation.  High farming relied on free trade in agriculture, imports of fertilizer, 
mechanization, large landholdings, and significant amounts of capital.  This system of 
farming was clearly designed to dispossess those who lacked the means to farm highly.  It 
limited access to land and reserved it for those with capital, yet the paper claimed that high 
farming and large farms came about naturally and ultimately benefited the rural poor.  On the 
contrary, high farming increased class divisions in the countryside, dispossessed the rural 
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poor of land, drove less skilled labour to the cities, and made them dependent on the market 
for their daily needs.  Those alarmed by the effects of free trade and the condition of rural 
labourers called for measures that would reduce their suffering.  In its desire to cement 
capitalist relations of production, The Economist worked to convince those who read the 
paper to stand firm and not give in to any feelings of sympathy they might have for the rural 
poor.  The paper vigorously argued against a return to agricultural protection, denounced any 
scheme of assistance to farmers, and vehemently opposed any return to self-provisioning or 
any attempt to ameliorate poverty using measures it felt were inconsistent with the principles 
of political economy.  This was clearly not the working of market forces, but the intervention 
of the state through deliberate policies designed to restrict the rural poor’s ability to provide 
for their own needs. 
The Economist was concerned with the creation of a labour force that was disciplined 
to the market and a society that was re-ordered so as to allow the market to function, but was 
unwilling to trust market forces to accomplish this.  Rather, the paper depended on methods 
of discipline, surveillance, and control.  It promoted techniques of government – particularly 
education, decent homes, and a strict administration of the Poor Laws – that would work to 
change the behaviour of the rural poor.  Although the paper argued the rural poor would 
ultimately benefit from education, reconstructed homes, and very limited access to poor relief, 
these were methods of primitive accumulation that would remove their last right to 
subsistence and control their labour.  Based on a long-held belief that the poor were 
dangerous and needed to be controlled, and on its desire to secure capitalist relations of 
production, The Economist sought to suppress the rural poor’s ability to promote alternative 
claims, visions, or forms of behaviour that were not amenable to capitalist relations and 
ensure they had no alternative to wage labour.   
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Thus far from doing away with state intervention, the need for control, regulation, and 
intervention increased in range.  The heavy hand of the state was needed to enclose land, 
secure overseas markets, collect statistics, form a free trade in agriculture, create ‘good’ 
citizens and, in general, impose a system that was rejected by large numbers of people.  As 
the rural poor promoted ‘counter-conduct’ that challenged the dominance of the market, 
policies were needed to ensure that traditional solidarities, habits of leisure, or garden 
allotments did not interfere with the free working of the market.  The Economist, whose 
whole philosophy demanded the restriction of state activities, had to entrust the state with the 
powers and instruments required for the establishment and maintenance of a self-regulating 
market.3   
Yet The Economist, like its idol Adam Smith who helped construct the idea of ‘the 
self-regulating market’, continually championed free reign for market forces while obscuring 
the government pressure and compulsion required for such reign.4  Michael Perelman, in The 
Invention of Capitalism, pointed out that the work of Adam Smith and other classical political 
economists has been interpreted by many as pure economic theory.  They created a powerful 
discourse, still influential today, that explained the origin, logic, and ‘rightness’ of capitalism.  
But, he maintained, the classical political economists appeared to have intentionally obscured, 
or remained silent about, the government pressure needed to separate the rural poor from the 
means of subsistence in order to avoid the challenge primitive accumulation posed for their 
claim that market forces organized production.  By doing so, they portrayed capitalism as an 
essentially benign process and created the impression of “a humanitarian heritage of political 
economy.”5   
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The Economist also contributed to the impression of a humanitarian political economy 
by continually recasting the harsh reality of capitalist development in the English countryside 
in as favourable a light as possible.  It made an unnatural system seem natural, wanting us to 
believe that a market economy came about through an inevitable, voluntary process that was 
beneficial for all.  It repeatedly justified and legitimized policies that furthered primitive 
accumulation.  This position was necessary to secure support for capitalism; it made the 
magnitude of the sufferings that were to be inflicted on the rural poor, the huge increases in 
social inequality, the harsh methods of discipline and control, and other injustices that were 
fundamental to the development and advancement of capitalism more palatable.6  Because 
The Economist’s most important task was to spread faith in capitalism by making its 
inequality and poverty more acceptable, it was (and is) one of the most dangerous newspapers 
in the world.   
The Economist contributed to the ideological environment out of which British 
industrial capitalism emerged and the views it espoused became pervasively woven into 
modern thought, influencing agricultural and economic development policy around the 
world.7  Its account of England’s progress has been the progenitor of much of what has 
happened in the rest of the world; indeed, it has become the main concern of nearly all 
countries to achieve economic growth and increase their national wealth.  Most often, the 
rural poor’s self-provisioning and indifference to wage labour are seen as obstacles to this 
project of progress and social order. 
As improvement, now understood as development, continues in much of the so-called 
developing world, we have an obligation to scrutinize The Economist’s falsification of the 
historical relation between labour and capital.  This thesis contributes to a better 
understanding of the processes and relationships of power by which people were integrated 
                                               
6
 Perelman, pp. 94, 174, 369-370. 
7
 Handy, “‘Almost Idiotic Wretchedness.’” 
124 
into the market.  It also disputes the idea that high agriculture was as productive or as 
successful as has been suggested and questions the wisdom of replicating such a model.  As 
well, it allows us to reject the paper’s claims that inequality based on the domination of the 
means of production by capital was some inherent, natural, or necessary state; rather, this 
thesis demonstrates that this particular type of inequality developed out of an actual historical 
experience, identified most clearly by Marx who detailed the brutality of separating people 
from the means of production.  Since scientific agriculture based on the dispossession of the 
peasantry and the need to collect ‘wealth into heaps and population into dense masses’, and, 
indeed, capitalism was not inevitable but the result of particular policies, we can challenge it 
and work toward envisioning alternative ways to live and produce.   
Despite all evidence that the free working of the market required government force 
and coercion, many continue to believe in and uphold the idea of laissez faire.  Belief did not 
arise spontaneously, but took shape collectively in the course of history through the efforts of 
proponents of laissez faire.8  The Economist may have been (and may still be) one of the most 
effective and sophisticated proponents of laissez faire.  It contributed to shaping and 
spreading belief partly because of how it conveyed its arguments in a scientific and objective 
style.  It was also influential because of who read The Economist, mainly men of business and 
governmental officials who signed the free trade petition of 1845, formulated policies, and 
passed laws.9  Moreover, the newspaper’s early editors had close ties to the British 
Parliament, which throughout the 19th century consolidated the interests of the middle and 
industrial classes.   
Many people acknowledged the significant role The Economist played in shaping and 
spreading belief in the 19th century.  Economist Frederic Bastiat claimed in 1846 that “there 
never was a periodical work in which all the questions of political economy were treated with 
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so much depth and impartiality.”10  Another supporter of The Economist declared that “from 
its talent and efficiency as an advocate of Free Trade . . . it has already done much towards 
removing the prejudice and ignorance which at present oppose themselves to a more liberal 
commercial system.”11  Walter Bagehot, The Economist’s most famous editor, wrote on 
James Wilson’s death in 1860: “We may observe that through the pages of this journal certain 
doctrines, whether true or false, have been diffused, far more widely than they ever were in 
England before – far more widely than from their somewhat abstract nature we could expect 
them to be diffused.”12  For nearly a century and half since, The Economist has continued to 
diffuse the doctrine of economic liberalism around the world.
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